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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to present the oppertunities and 
challenges posed by the new (1982) Law of the Sea Convention. 
Even though the convention has not yet entered into force the 
application of the convention provisions on extended 
jurisdiction granted to coastal states has become customary 
in its application and thus of international legal practice. 
This paper aims to ptesent the issues and the factors 
involved for the successful application and extracted 
benefits of this new oceans regime as applicable in 
fisheries. More specifically this paper aims to show that the 
Namibian fisheries administration is in a unique position 
through it's recently acquired independence in March 1990 to 
learn from practical applications and some of the problems 
raised for fisheries administrations.
Namibia is in the unique position in so much as it can , to a 
certian extent start afresh and try to avoid the mistakes 
made in other developing countries by developing a maritime 
fishery administration that can benefit the Namibian 
population in real terms as envisaged by the original 
proponents of the convention both for improved management and 
a just and equitable distribution of living marine resources.
CHAI»TEF5 1
INTRODUCTION
The U.N. Convent ion on the Law of the Sea was signed by 
119 countries in Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 December 1982. 
Despite tbe failure to reach consensus on the whole of the 
convention the fisheries provision of the earlier 1975 
Negotiated Text has remained largely unchanged. Central to 
these provisions on fisheries is the concept of extended 
coastal jurisdiction in terms of which all the natural living 
or non living resources in an exclusive economic zone 
extending beyond and including the territorial sea for a 
distance of 200 mile seawards falls within the jurisdiction 
of the coastal state. This extended jurisdiction, however 
consists of both rights and duties. The coastal state has 
the responsibility for fisheries management within the zone, 
power of regulation’ of access to -the living resources 
dependent on the availability and a declared surplus as well 
as the coastal state's own capacity to harvest the resource.
Despite the fact that the convention has not yet entered 
into force (12 months after deposit of the 60 th instrument 
of ratification or accession) it>s extended coastal state 
jurisdiction provisions have been implemented by coastal 
states world wide. It has become accepted international 
practice and can be regarded as residing under customary 
international law.
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Namibia ratified the Law of the Sea Convention on 18 
April 1983 (the fifth state to do so) and therefore there is 
a real obligation on the Namibian state to implement the 
provisions of the Convention in the management of it's ocean 
territory and resources.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the various 
issues and problems which have evolved in the application of 
the convention as regards the regime of fisheries. Issues, 
problems and experiences in the implementation of schemes for 
fisheries resource management, regulations, allocation and 
control over access to foreign vessels and enforcement will 
be discussed hereunder.
This paper will furthermore try to relate these issues 
and problems to Namibia and the sequence will be as follows; 
a) Part I. Chapter 1 will briefly provide a historical 
background to the Namibian fisheries. b) Part II Chapters 2 
to 5 will deal with specific issues for consideration 
generally under a fisheries regime. c) Part III Chapter 6 
will try to relate the above issues to Namibia for 
consideration in fisheries development.
GENERAL.
1) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.
After the first World War, Namibia was administered by 
South-Africa under a C-Mandate of the League of Nations on 
behalf of Britain. The mandate to South-Africa included 
certain obligations namely the promotion of the material and
2
moral well-being and social progress of all the people of the 
territory. However South-Africa sought instead to annex the 
territory as a fifth South-Africa province and continued to 
exploit it's natural and human resources. South-Africa 
furthermore extended it's apartheid and Bantustan policies 
into the territory.
As far back as 1946 South-Africa proposed to the U.N 
General Assembly to incorporate the territory into the Union 
of South Africa This proposal was rejected and the 
U.N.General Assembly recommended instead that the territory 
be placed under the International Trusteeship system. In 
1966 the U.N.G.A resolved in resolution 2145(XX1) that the 
South-African administration be terminated. South-Africa 
however refused to acknowledge the U.N jurisdiction over the 
territory arguing that since the mandate was granted under 
the League of Nations the U.N had no jurisdiction to decide 
over the territory. South-Africa continued to defy the U.N. 
and in 1971 the continued occupation of Namibia was declared 
illegal by the International Court of Justice. The U.N.G.A 
furthermore established the U.N.Council for Namibia in 
Resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 to administer and secure 
independence for the territory from South-Africa .Despite 
these efforts South-Africa continued it>s illegal occupation 
of Namibia in defiance of the international community. 
Through various legal and diplomatic maneuvering South—Afxica 
allies continued to occupy Namibia and even stepped up it's 
exploitation of the natural and human resources, of the 
country, applied it's abhorrent policies of apartheid(racial 
fragmentation) and bantustanization dividing the country 
along social, economic and racial lines.
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South-African colonial policies and operations in 
Namibia was based on the maximum exploitation of the natural 
resources and the externalization of the wealth generated 
there. The consequence of this continued and accelerated 
plunder of the natural resources is evident in the overmining 
overfishing and environmental degradation which took place at 
the time. It thus remained a profitable colonialisation and 
hence the reluctance on the part of South-Africa to grant 
independence to the territory. South-Africa and it<^ allies 
predominantly Britain and the U.S.A. had a vested interest in 
the continued exploitation of Namibia's rich mineral and fish 
resources. Namibia furthermore developed a lopsided economy 
along selective sectoral concentration with emphasis on 
mining and fishing, whereas the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors remained virtually non existent. The 
Namibian economy and infrastructure was developed in such a 
manner that it continued to serve South-African interest. 
The Namibian economy remains to date dependent on the import 
of food and other manufactured goods from South-African . 
The Namibian economy will therefore continue to remain 
heavily dependent on South-African imports for the
foreseeable future. Mining presently forms approximately 50% 
of the total GNP.^^^ Due to various factors such as the "the 
abundance of relatively easy to work rich ore bodies, 
the proximity of the South-African economy, the near absence 
of many strategic minerals in South-Africa and a captive 
cheap labour market because of apartheid policies."'^’ It 
paid South-Africa to concentrate on mining in Namibia. ."As a 
result of the lopsided economy and development, the country 
today produces goods which are not used in the country and 
consumes goods which are not domestically produced" .
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Namibia has since gained independence from South-Africa 
on 21 March 1990 through a western powers brokered agreement 
with South-Africa and implemented jointly by the U.N and 
South-Africa. The new government and the people of Namibia 
thus inherited many economic and social problems with 
independence. New innovative development plans, policies and 
programs need to be adopted to reverse the lopsided economy 
and social inadequacies. Economic reform and development 
should thus be geared and implemented towards agricultural 
and manufacturing capability ,and self-reliance. Development 
is however presently hampered by factors such as the world 
recession in raw materials and the lack of long term raw 
material export contracts due to the existence of sanctions 
against South-Africa and consequently Namibia at the time and 
these contract have since expired and never renewed since 
independence. Social inequalities in areas such as health, 
education, training and housing should be high priorities and 
eradicated as soon as possible.
The fishing industry in Namibia can contribute 
significantly towards economic growth and social parity if 
properly and efficiently planned and managed. The fishing 
industry can furthermore provide employment and a source of 
foreign exchange if developed towards processing and 
manufacturing capability.
Various aspects of the fishing industry will hence be 
discussed due to the past and ,future importance of the 
sector. - . *
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2) TYPES OF FISH STOCKS
Within the Namibian EEZ there are two main types of fish 
stocks namely those that are grouped as inshore pelagic fish 
such as Clupeid, Pilchard, and anchovy and those further 
offshore, pelagic stocks of mainly Horse Mackerel, Chub 
Mackerel and the valuable demersal species of Hake. The 
latter is distributed throughout the whole water column with 
its largest distribution offshore but extending into 
shallower waters inshore ( the latter being mostly of the 
juvenile population). The inshore pelagic fisheries for 
pilchard is exploited mostly by the Namibian based purse 
seine fleet whereas the offshore trawling for hake and horse 
mackerel is being exploited by distant water fleets from a 
variety of nations. Prior to independence'^^ and the 
declaration of an EEZ'=^ the offshore trawling for the 
valuable hake and horse mackerel were under the management of 
the now defunct ICSEAF'®^ which included areas of Angola and 
South-Africa. The inshore fisheries were at the time managed 
by the South-African administration in Windhoek.
Due to a lack of proper control, absence of surveys and 
due to mismanagement of the fisheries resources as well as 
the jurisdictional problems relating to the status of the 
country at the time''"^ both inshore (almost exclusively by 
South African interest) and offshore pelagic and demersal 
stocks were heavily exploited by foreigners with little 
return to the Namibian population. This has led to a drastic 
decrease in the stocks between certain periods.'®’ These two 
groups of fish stocks however constitute the main although 
jjot the only species of fish stocks within the Namibian 
waters. Main species in this sense referring to its biomass.
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economic exploitability and value. The state of these inshore 
and offshore fish stocks shows an alarming decline in the 
biomass before and after the period of 1980 in terms of both 
TAG'S and recorded statistics of landings.
In addition to the abovementioned types of fish there 
are a number of less abundant fish and shellfish. Although 
there are also others, only the better known and 
economically significant types are named here namely snoek, 
kingklip, sole, monkfish, squid, deep sea crabs and rock 
lobsters, the latter being exported mostly to Japan and the 
U.S.A, In this group of other pelagic fish stock snoek, a 
large predatory species of horse mackerel is by far the most 
important as to it's economic value and abundance. The latter 
are exploited mostly by longline and trawl vessels.
As this paper does not purport to offer extensive 
knowledge in the fishery science information the stocks are 
briefly mentioned here only for the sake of completeness (See 
Annex I).
3) EARLY EXPLOITATION AND PRE-INDEPENDENCE DESTRUCTION OF THE 
FISHING RESOURCES.
As access to information on this subject matter has been 
rather limited this section refers specifically only to the 
destruction of the pilchard (inshore) and hake and horse 
mackerel (offshore)
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A) The destruction of the pilchards.
The spectacular rise in the pelagic fish- processing in 
the mid 1940’s, together with the* fall of the Californian 
sardine (1946-1952) and the consequent redundancy of 
machinery and equipment gave rise to the mushrooming of 
canneries and fishmeal plants in the Cape and subsequently to 
Namibia. Transfer of such machinery and equipment from the 
U.S.A to the Cape together with an already existing market to 
supply in South-Africa and elsewhere led to a rush for 
factory licenses in Namibia.
The abovementioned factors led to an increase in the 
number of vessels which competed tremendously to land as 
large a volume of fish as possible to such an extent that the 
factories were periodically swamped with raw fish.^^°^ The 
overlarge fleet and the extremely efficient and thus 
wasteful gear employed led to tremendous waste as only the 
most valuable species were actually landed while the less 
valuable were discarded. This state of affairs in conjunction 
with the collapse of the Californian sardine led the then 
South West African Administration to adopt and promulgate the 
Seal and Fisheries Ordinance in 1949. However, as this 
Ordinance merely restricted the number and processing 
capacity of the factories the South West African 
Administration introduced during the periods 1952-1964 
further control measures. These measures which included 
among others, the banning of any further expansion of the 
number and capacity of the licensed factories, limiting the 
number and gross tonnage of the fishing boats supplying each 
factory and introducing quotas for each factory thus limiting 
the intake of raw fish for processing per factory. ‘ ^ These
8
measures were effective in terms of increased processing 
efficiency, the reduction of the purse seiner fleet and 
controlled fishing programmes. These restrictions however 
led to the quotas being filled within a short period and the 
subsequent under utilization of the expensive factory 
machinery and vessels.
The dominant positions occupied by the representatives 
of the factories in, the Fisheries Development Advisory 
Board^^^^ and their influence on the administration in the 
1959-1964 period led to an ever increasing annual quota 
allocation and even mid-season quotas were granted, bearing 
in mind that the inshore stocks were still controlled by 
South-Africa. The overall quotas trebled within 5 years 
between the years 1960 - 1964 leading to increased processing 
capacity for both canneries and reduction plants.
By the year 1966 the factories, not yet satisfied once 
more demanded increased quotas as they claimed that the 
existing quotas limited their production capacity to a mere 
60%^^^>. Furthermore some companies blocked by the 
administration from allowing more processing capacity on land 
moved outside the 22 kilometer coastal limit over which the 
then administration had no jurisdiction.^The companies 
also introduced factory vessels to operate outside the 22 km 
limit from bases in South Africa. This led to open conflict 
between the SWA - administration and the Cape provincial 
authorities. But, as these factory vessels were operating 
outside the 22 kilometer limits and thus outside it’s 
jurisdiction, the SWA-administration was helpless and as 
countermeasures further increased the domestic fleet capacity 
through higher quota allocations. With the total lack of any
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form of constraint these factory vessels slaughtered the 
pilchards through excessive catches depleting the adult 
biomass to almost half. By the late 1970's the pilchard 
landings dropped to almost 40% within 2 years.Quotas 
were henceforth (about 1971) split between pilchards and 
other species and for the first time the inshore fishing 
fleet increased their "other species" catches of anchovy and 
horse mackerel. However by 1972 - 1974 the adult pilchard 
stock had doubled and this trend continued mainly due to 
favorable environmental conditions. This led to the false 
assumption of a recovered stock and an increase in quotas of 
approximately 500,000 tons in 1974. In the meantime the 
pelagic fish industry at the height of it's prosperity in 
1974 already contributed significantly to the GNP‘, 
approximately 10%, and 15% of total exports. This was 
complimented by increased western demand, the subsequent 
canning boom (a labour intensive industry) in the same period 
(1974) and it's resultant employment opportunities.
The canning boom was however shortlived as it was based 
on the false assumption that the stock would continue to 
recover to it's 1972/1974 peak. The absence of proper surveys 
and the small number of juvenile stock were surely to lead to 
a collapse in the industry in the same way as the 
Californian, sardine and this were already evident when in 
1976 the absence of pilchards amongst the catches were 
obvious. Subsequent surveys revealed the depletion of the 
stock but the authorities failed to close the factories and 
merely reduced the quotas which remained unfilled at 200,000 
tons in 1977. In 1978 the season was closed after only 46,000 
were caught in a period of 3-4 months. Since 1978 the adult
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stock continued to be estimated at under 100,000 tonnes less 
than 2% of the 1968 biomass. ‘ ^
Catch quotas were subsequently introduced ranging 
between 30,000 tonnes and 35,000 tonnes between 1982/1983. 
These reduced quotas were in fact far in excess of scientific 
recommendations for a maximum of at least 20,000 as a 1982 
survey*^®^ already showed that the central population had not 
recovered at all. In order to keep up production of fishmeal 
the factories now turned to catching anchovies, depleting 
their population from an estimated biomass of 750,000 tonnes 
(1960) to between 40,000 and 150,000 tonnes in 1974.
The declining catches led to a reduction in the fleets 
and the collapse of the inshore cannery industry and 
resultant mass unemployment. ^ ^ By the end of 1983 only 
four out of nine factories remained operational and at 
reduced capacity^
B) The offshore hake and horse mackerel.
The offshore stocks were administered and managed by 
ISCEAF.^^^^ The major offshore species, mainly hake, horse 
mackerel and to a lesser degree high valued sole, were caught 
mainly by foreign deep sea trawlers from the former Soviet 
Union, Poland and Spain. But by the mid 1960's they were 
caught to an increasing degree by South Africa. It was 
estimated that the offshore foreign fleet consisted of as 
many as 100 vessels flying more than 15 different flags by 
1970 and in the peak year of 1978 a total of 172 foreign 
trawlers were reported off the Namibian coast including 29 
factory vessels. These catches, numbering about an estimated
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60,000 tonnes in 1963, rose to approximately 500,000 tonnes 
in 1965 and to an all time peak of approximately 1.5 million 
tonnes in 1978. By as early as 1970 the catches from these 
foreign vessels already matched those of the inshore pelagic 
catches and since the collapse of the inshore pelagic 
industry contributed more than three quarters of the total 
catches in the Namibian waters.
At this stage the inshore factory fleet's participation 
in the offshore fishing was negligible as the white fish 
caught offshore were from the viewpoint of the inshore 
industry unsuitable for canning. The failure of the Namibian 
and South African based industries to exploit the offshore 
stocks can furthermore be contributed to the following 
factors.
(1) The offshore pelagic fish, especially the horse 
mackerel, is not,a suitable species for canning although 
it is good for meal and oil due to it's mid water 
habitat.
(2) The mid-water habitat of this species needs larger more 
sophisticated and consequently expensive vessels for 
more efficient large scale catching. By the mid 1970's 
there were at least 24 factory vessels, mostly of Soviet 
origin, as well as approximately 100 plus fishing 
vessels exploiting the offshore pelagic species and 
horse mackerel as well as other species such as hake and 
sole.
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(3) South African and Namibian interest were unable to 
compete with these foreign vessels from technologically 
advanced and economically rich countries.
(4) Also the demand for fresh and frozen white fish was 
negligible in Namibia and limited in South Africa as 
local human consumption especially in Namibia has never 
been very high.
(5) Lastly, the emergence of large freezer trawlers
(foreign) making long distance fishing for white fish 
more efficient and economically viable, as well as an 
increase in South-African consumption and declining 
stocks closer inshore, were also contributing factors in 
the stock decline.
Increasing hake fishing activity in the mid 1960-1970’s 
mostly by the Spanish, was soon joined by the Soviets on a 
large scale. By 1968, and between 1968 and 1972, hake made up 
approximately 90% of the total long distance trawler catch. 
The decline of the hake stock was soon evident with increased 
effort to maintain high catches and these foreign vessels 
turned their attention to other types of fish mainly horse 
mackerel. The Soviets especially fished at all depths and 
indiscriminately for pilchards nearer the surface, horse 
mackerel in mid water and hake at the bottom. The hake stocks 
were thus severely depleted by the 1980's with the lowest 
catches since 1965 in that year. The horse mackerel suffered 
a similar fate due to the increased recruitment and the 
absence of competition from the already depleted hake and 
pilchard stocks. Although the offshore fishing effort remains 
essentially a two species fishery, attention was soon
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diverted to other types of fish such as snoek and chub 
mackerel. As early as 1977-1978, the occasional long line 
tuna fishing vessels and the deep sea crab vessels were seen 
off the southern coast
It is therefore evident that the Namibian fish resources 
have been severely exploited and depleted over the past 20 
years due to indiscriminate overfishing, lack of control and 
jurisdiction by Namibian nationals with little if any return 
of value to the rightful owners, namely the Namibian people. 
The value of these exploited resources, over the period of 
more than twenty years, in monetary term can only be 
described as astronomical and is estimated to run into 
billions of dollars. Valuable income was lost for the 
indigenous Namibian people who are now saddled with the 
problems and enormous 'task of recovery through control and 
conservation.
4) OVERFISHING-WHY IT HAPPENED.
Various factors may be regarded as having contributed 
directly or indirectly to past overfishing and the consequent 
depletion of the marine living “resources (fish stocks) within 
the Namibian waters. The main reasons could be briefly 
summarized as the following but not limited thereto with 
specific reference to the Namibian situation.
A) Namibia has for many years been colonized mainly by 
South-Africa and administered as if it was a fifth 
province of that country. South-Africa buil(f an 
infrastructure into the Namibian territory, geared
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towards the industry of South-Africa, colonial self 
interest and the question as to jurisdiction over the 
country contributed to the plundering on a free for all 
basis of the Namibian fish resources.
B) Advanced technology in the exploitation of the fish 
resources e.g., larger more efficient vessels, factory 
vessels with processing capabilities and increasing 
fleet capacity, contributed to the overexploitation 
within the Namibian waters.
C) The demands of the economics of scale required large 
investment with increasing production capacity.
D) The philosophies of competition versus conservation saw 
the latter ignored by those who would benefit most from 
it in the long term such as the factory owners and the 
fisherman themselves. This attitude is displayed in the 
thinking of, "If i do not catch enough and fill my quota 
then someone else will".
E) Uncontrolled industrial fishing took place on a large 
scale with indiscriminate methods due to the question as 
to the Namibian territories international status prior 
to independence. Further, no one had jurisdiction at the 
time to declare a 200 nautical mile EEZ and the ICSEAF 
at the time only had limited terms of reference.
F) The absence of a constructive fisheries policy, limited 
control, efficient management and research.
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G) The attitude of the exploiters of the fishery resources 
regarded it as an unlimited and unending self repro­
ducing resource. The absence of research and education 
precluded the development of management techniques 
bearing in mind that the fisheries are a resource whose 
stock levels cannot be determined with absolute 
certainty.
H) Short term financial advantages of immediate commercial 
yield and the profit motive have been the priority.
5) PRESENT AND FUTURE FISHERIES POTENTIAL.
The facts indicate that the present state of the stocks 
are at an alarming low level, as to its biomass. The slow 
recovery of the stocks can be blamed almost exclusively on 
fishing methods with disregard for juvenile stocks and 
breeding grounds. Earlier indiscriminate and uncontrolled 
over-exploitation of the fish resources directly contributed 
to the present position and is more than a source of concern
As can be seen from the attached statistics in Annex V, 
both the inshore stocks for pilchards, red herring and 
anchovies etc. and the offshore stocks of hake, and horse 
mackerel has significantly dropped in terms of catches and 
landings of these stocks between the periods of 1960-1980 
although the horse mackerel seem to be in a healthier state. 
The catches have dropped from 8.5 million tons per year in 
the years 1965-1967 to approximately 4.5 million tons per 
year in the years 1976-1983 for the inshore pilchards and
16
from 1.5 million tons in 1968 to 0.5 million tons in 1980 for 
the offshore hake. The figures are especially depressing as 
regards the dwindling stocks of hake. (See Annex IV & V). 
One must, however, bear in mind that the fishing for horse 
mackerel usually has a bycatch of hake.
The future potential for the fishing industry is 
entirely dependant on the priority given to this sector 
within the overall governmental plan. With the introduction 
of proper management and regulatory control measures in line 
with declared government policy^ recovery of the fish 
stocks in general could be achieved over a long term period. 
(See attached annex of long term estimates) and maintained 
through an initial and intermediate period of conservative 
TAC,s and quotas. Working on the basis of these estimates and 
declared policy the potential for this sector in the future 
economic development of the country could indeed be 
significant and could eventually contribute to a large extent 
to the national economy.The self generating spin-offs 
from a well managed fisheries sector could become of major 
importance in terms of employment, foreign currency earnings 
and the GNP as well as the per capita income of the country.
The future potential of the sector depends on the 
policies adopted by the present and future governments and 
people of Namibia. It is equally dependent upon the ability 
to implement such policies and the willingness to aim for 
long term goals instead of self defeating short term 
priorities of immediate financial gain. The priority granted 
to the sector within the overall development plan shall 
therefore surely determine its future potential. If given the 
priority it deserves and work towards stated objectives
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proceeds its future potential could indeed be significant to 
the country not only as for its financial benefits but also 
for its national contribution as a source of food.
It is however a well fact that today's priorities are 
not necessarily tomorrow's as these change in relation to 
prevailing circumstances. The future development of other 
potential marine resources such as oil and gas^^®^ will to a 
large extend determine the future of the fisheries sector as 
to it's percentage contribution to the overall national 
economy. It is however recognized that a fishery can exist 
next to oil and gas exploration activities as for instance in 
the Gulf of Mexico.
6. THE NAMIBIAN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE.
1) Right's and duties under the EEZ.
In terms of article 56 and 58 of the Convention coastal 
states have rights as well as certain duties under it>s EEZ. 
Article 56 grants the coastal state the right to "explore and 
exploit, conserving and managing the living and non living 
resources". Article 58 however limits the rights of the 
coastal state by granting other states certain rights within 
the EEZ of such coastal state such as the "right of
navigation and overflight ___ and other international uses
of the sea". Article 62 however refers specifically to the 
utilization of the living resources and grants the coastal 
states the right to "determine it>s capacity to harvest the 
living resources of the EEZ" but, "where the coastal state 
does not have the capacity to harvest the total allowable
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catch, it shall through agreements or other arrangements and 
pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws.... give other states 
access to the surplus of the allowable catch."
One must however bear in mind that under UNCLOS 82 the 
EEZ can be regarded as a hybrid zone between the maritime 
zone and the territorial sovereignty (internal waters, 
territorial sea) and the maritime zones with a regime of 
freedom organized by international law (high seas, 
continental shelf) Within this zone the adjacent coastal 
state does not have the equivalent of territorial sovereignty 
but sovereign rights for the purposes of exploiting the 
resources of the EEZ. Because many countries regard the 
territorial sea and the 200 mile EEZ zones as part of the 
same regime for fisheries management purposes the territorial 
sea will be treated as inclusive when talking about fisheries 
and the right and duties within the EEZ of the coastal state 
under UNCLOS 3. However, one must bear in mind that some 
rights are exclusive such as the right to exploit the 
resources, that is economic activities directly using natural 
resources. E.g. protection of energy from water, wind or 
stream, artificial islands and platforms etc. But some rights 
are sometimes not exclusive such as fishing rights. The 
difference is the result of the fact that the competencies of 
the coastal states are specific as to their jurisdiction 
within their territorial waters (see article 65) whereas they 
are not specific but limited in the EEZ and the competencies 
therefore not exclusive. Article 73 sets out the limits of 
the EEZ subject to which the coastal state may enforce the 
laws and issue regulations governing the exercise of it's 
sovereign rights and it's jurisdiction in the EEZ. Article 
73 in this regard grants the coastal state specific rights of
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arrest, inspection of foreign vessels," as may be necessary 
to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by 
it in conformity with this convention." Article 63 para.3 
however, accords certain rights to third states in relation 
to the non exclusive jurisdiction afforded, such state in 
terms of the convention. All third states can have recognized 
rights in the EEZ of another country. This principle concerns 
especially states which have originally fished in the zone or 
which have made substantial efforts in research and 
identification of fish stocks. These rights of third states 
are however subject to the following.
(1) A surplus has to exist.
(2) This surplus is known when the coastal state does not
have the capacity to harvest the total allowable catch.
These two factors are determined by the coastal state. 
In addition the third state needs - an authorization by the 
coastal state as set out in Article 58, para 3. This article 
authorizes the coastal state to establish specific 
regulations regarding fishing rights such as license fees, 
quotas, and technical measures.
In terms of the above provisions and their 
interpretation the coastal state is given a certain 
flexibility in order to control fishing activity within it>s 
EEZ. These provisions have therefore in this specific area of 
fisheries left the coastal state with a broad and general 
discretion in the exercise of it>s powers in the EEZ. This 
discretion given to the coastal state can be utilized in it s 
own interest .through legislation and management of the
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resourcBS. Third statss with unproven track records and 
motives, to the detriment of the coastal state and the 
resources can be excluded by not granting to them access 
within the EEZ and thus the fishing grounds. This can be 
achieved through the implementation of legislative sanctions, 
e.g. non compliance with any agreement terms and conditions 
of access. This could be considered similar to a breach of 
the contract, resulting in the contract, license etc.being 
suspended.
The jurisdiction and discretion granted to the coastal 
state regarding it^s fishing resources should therefore be 
implemented into national legislation to the benefit of such 
states. The policy and legislation of the coastal state as to 
it's fishing resources should be reflected in the access 
agreements and be favorable to such state. The position and 
overlapping EEZ of the Walvis Bay and the islands belonging 
to South Africa ‘ can be seen in the Annex II and its 
accompanying jurisdictional and enforcement problems clearly 
imagined. The enclave and islands limits the Namibian EEZ and 
cuts through it and can thus be exploited by countries 
fishing illegally in the territory.
2) The UN convention on the law of the sea and it's
application.
As Namibia became independent on March 1990 and a new 
full member of the UN. it acceded to the convention on the 
law of the sea 1978. She declared an exclusive economic zone 
in term of the provisions of the convention by way of Act No. 
3 of 1990 called the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic 
Zone of Namibia Act 1990. This was published in the
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Government Gazette No.28 on 11 June 1990. This act enabled 
the Namibian government to extend it's sovereignty as a 
coastal state as defined in UNCLOS 82. Art.55 defines the EEZ 
in legal terms as adjacent to the territorial sea. From 
UNCLOS 82-article 55, "The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent 
to the territorial sea..." but within this Zone the adjacent 
coastal state does not have the equivalent of territorial 
sovereignty. Article 58 para 1 keeps, "the freedom of 
navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine 
cables and pipelines.." This disposition creates the 
difference between the territorial sea and the EEZ. Secondly 
the EEZ does not belong to the high seas. From UNCLOS 82 - 
article 86, the high seas is, "All parts of the sea that are 
not included in the EEZ, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of the state, or in the archipelagic waters 
of an archipelagic state". The real nature of the EEZ 
however remains ambiguous because it is defined negatively in 
relation to the high seas and only by the adjacency with 
regard to the territorial sea. The EEZ can best be described 
as a hybrid zone between the territorial sea and the 
maritime zone (internal waters-territorial sea) and the 
maritime zones with a regime of freedom organized by the 
international law (high seas-continental shelf).
This extended jurisdiction over living and nonliving 
resources within the Namibian EEZ enabled Namibia to gain 
control over it's rights and duties within the jurisdiction 
afforded it in term of the concept of an EEZ. Before the 
declaration of an EEZ by an independent Namibian government 
it's rich fishery resources within the now declared EEZ were 
formerly regarded as part of the High Seas and severely 
exploited by foreign fishing vessels- with no real return for
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the country. The driving force behind the extended coastal 
jurisdiction in terms of the convention was the fisheries 
situation in third world countries. The rationale behind the 
extended jurisdiction was that these countries expected to 
receive particular advantages from extended coastal 
jurisdiction. "This is however not the case in reality due to 
the fact that their own resources were poorly exploited and 
there was strong competition from the technologically 
advanced fleets of industrialized countries^ ^ Examples of 
this statement can be seen in the case of Mozambique and the 
Seychelles although to a lesser extent with regard to the 
latter. Namibia should therefore avoid making the same 
mistakes and learn from the experiences of other third world 
countries. The rights and duties accorded coastal states 
under the UNCLOS convention over their EEZ's should be more 
effectively and advantageously used by these countries in the 
granting of exploitation rights to foreign fleets.
The application of the law of the sea convention has 
however not had the intended result or changed the local 
situation in many African countries. Only some Latin American 
and South east Asian countries such as Chile, Mexico, South 
Korea and Thailand can be said to have shown significant 
increases in total catches as a result of the extended 
jurisdiction granted them under the convention. In Africa 
however the situation remains bleak and rather one of 
stagnation and reduction. Overall most coastal states have 
only shown moderate or insignificant growth. The law of the 
sea convention has however opened the possibility of 
affording coastal states increasing jurisdiction whereby they 
could grant fishing rights to foreign countries by concluding 
access agreements with companies of industrialized nations
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thereby assuring guaranteed payments in exchange. This seems 
to be the general trend followed by the majority of coastal 
states especially in Africa. The main reasons for this 
development can be said to be the inability of these states 
to exploit the resources themselves, lack of financing and 
the fact that they are unable to compete with industrialized 
countries and to a certain extent for historical reasons 
where exploitation of the fishery resources is still done 
mostly by their former colonial masters. Access agreements 
are therefore a means for these countries to obtain at least 
some financial return on these fishing resources. Agreements 
in themselves are fine but most African countries lack the 
means of effectively enforcing the terms and conditions of 
such agreements. Most agreements have also been badly
negotiated. The main effect of the extended jurisdiction for 
most developing countries has therefore been financial or 
some other form of compensation in exchange for fishing 
rights. Financial compensation in the form of foreign
exchange was thus the main effect of the EEZ' s on 
distribution for third world countries. Some Indian Ocean 
developing countries such as Mozambique and Seychelles are 
heavily dependent on their fisheries and have chosen a 
political policy which to a large extent involves foreign 
fishing. However these agreements have had little real
returns for these two countries due to poor negotiation, lack 
of knowledge of the resources and noncompliance. This is 
especially true with regard to Mozambique as the Seychelles 
has had a certain measure of success in obtaining some 
indirect benefits.‘^
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ENDNOTES.
CHAPTER 1 . . •
"In recent years minerals have accounted for about 85 % 
of the total exports of the territory. Tax receipts from 
this source constitute about half of the estimated 
government revenue. Mineral sales includes uranium sales from Namibia amounted to R869.6 million in 1980." UN 
Institute for Namibia "Perspectives for National 
Reconstruction and Development."1986 - 88.Chapter 8.p.292.
Ibid. p.16.para.3
Ibid.
c4> Namibian independence date was 21 March 1990.
The Namibian EEZ was declared by way of Act 3 of 1990 
called the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of 
Namibia Act 1990. Published in Government Gazette No. 28 on 11 June 1990.
International Commission for the South East Atlantic Fisheries.
Controvercy over jurisdiction of the then named South- 
West African/Namibian territory between the colonial 
power South-Africa and the U.N. The territory was administered by a minority of whites under Pretoria 
directives.
See Annex II, III & IV for the decrease in the stocks
See Annex II, III & IV for statistics of the period.
^^o>Read. 1969, pl59-60, 195-7. S.W.A Fisheries Industry 
Commission Report 1972.
cii>Read. 1969, p. 170-1 ,*177-8; Fishing Industry Commission 
Report 1972. p 63-8.
‘^^^In 1953 the Walvis Bay factory managers formed the Fish 
Factories Executive Commitee ( FFEC ) to represent their 
interest with the then S.W.A Administration. The company 
delegates under the ( FFEC ) dominated the official S.W.A 
Fisheries Development Advisory Board ( FDAB ).
<^3>New quotas in the period 1960 - 4 were increased annually 
in a series of steps which were regarded as temporary and 
mid-season quotas increases were also granted 15 % in 1959 and 11 % in 1963.
‘^^>Read 1969. p.259.
cisjitipjjg South African Territorial Waters Act of 1963 decreed 
an extension of the South African and Namibian territor­ial waters from 3 to 6 miles, with another 6 sea miles as 
an exclusive economic zone- making a total of 22 kilo­meters." See. Moorsom. p.22 footnote 18.
crash research program survey in 1970 revealed that the pilchard population had been reduced to three quarters 
within 3 years to a biomass of only 1.5 million tonnes 
and only then did the authorities take action.
<'*^’^^Stock assessments in ICSEAF CSP 1979-1982 and Thomas 
1982, Tables 8-10.
tisjThomas 1982.
<i9)Moorsom 1984 ; WA,NT passim.
'"^^^Fishing Industry Handbook 1982-1983 p. 11, 13, 15.
t>ICSEAF-International Commission for the Southeast
Atlantic Fisheries. See Map 1 for area of competence.
‘^^’Fishing Industry Commission 1972.p 115-116; Read 1969, 
p.256-8; WA 18 November 1980.
<=3>Mostly in the Southern coastal area of Luderitz where the 
Namibian deep sea crab and lobster fishery is situated.
^2'»>See Government White Paperon the National Fisheries 
Policy for the Republic of Namibia.Windhoek.June 1991.
C25)iiipj^g landed value of the annual catches in the late
1980's was around R500 million. It is however possible if 
this trend continue and value is added through processing 
in Namibia" See Government White Paper.June 1991 p.l8.
c26>Potential gas and oil exploration lots have recently been 
demarcaded off the Namibian coast by the Namibian 
government and exploration licences allocated to various international consortia.
«27>see May-Kirstin Ensrund. Forthcoming Research Report 
from the Fridtjof Namen Institute. Futher see also 
Chapter 4 (C) p.69.
<=^®JSee also Chapter 4.
CHAr>TEFe 2
FISHERIES RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The Law of the Sea Convention not only granted extended 
rights in the declaration of a 200 mile EEZ but also certain 
duties and responsibilities. In Part V of the Convention , 
Article 61 refers specifically to the duties of the coastal 
states to conserve the living marine living resources. Briefly 
the Article states that the coastal state shall:
(1) Determine the allowable catch of the living marine 
resources in the EEZ;
(2) Apply conservation and management measures for the 
maintenance of the living resources;
(3) That such measures be designed to maintain or restore 
populations of harvested species at levels which can 
produce the maximum sustainable yield;
(4) Such measures shall ensure that populations of harvested 
species be maintained at reproductive levels; and
(5) the dissemination of information and data relevant to the 
conservation of fish stocks.
In a paper,'"Options for the Management of Tuna fisheries 
in the Indian Ocean", W.T.Burke and Francis T. Christy Jr. 
state that, "In open access fisheries the benefits and cost of 
management generally accrue to different parties. Unless 
specific arrangements are made, the private sector receives 
the benefits in the form of higher catches per unit of effort
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(and higher average incomes) while the public sector tends to 
bear the full cost of implementing the management measures". 
This statement is essentially true also in the case of a 
fishery that is almost entirely commercial in nature such as 
the Namibian fishing industry. This responsibility to bear the 
cost of implementing conservation measures through management 
of the living resources within the Namibian EEZ therefore lies 
with the Namibian government. The Namibian government can 
therefore be regarded as the owners of the fish resources and 
as the principle who aims to achieve the maximum net benefit 
from the fishery. The function of government can be described 
as analogous to that of owners of other resources where 
effective property rights are in place such as e.g. 
agriculture.
In resource management especially those of fisheries, 
there are three main management functions:
a) Information acquisition and dissemination;
b) Control over production and the inputs of capital and
labour-regulation; and
c) Enforcement.
Effective management cannot be achieved unless.all three 
functions are fulfilled satisfactorily as well as the ability 
to deal with all the inevitable problems associated with the 
allocation of a TAC. The Namibian government, and in 
particular the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, is 
therefore the manager of the marine living resources within 
the Namibian EEZ and it is to them that the above functions 
accrue.
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In his paper Lee G.Anderson^ ^ ^ is o*f the opinion that, 
"despite the new management powers granted to coastal states 
in terms of the LOS Convention agreements within their EEZ's 
many developing countries failed to utilize the potential from 
the LOS agreements to build biologically and economically 
rational management systems". The strengthened position of 
domestic countries under these agreements has helped to obtain 
international assistance to begin to solve these problems. The 
difficulty he says lies with the political will or economic 
ability to tackle the problems.
However the management of the resources within the 
Namibian EEZ should be seen within the context of it's own 
peculiarities such as, the type of fish stocks, designated 
fishing areas, fishing methods, regulatory framework, etc.
PART ONE
A) PRINCIPLES FOR A NAMIBIAN FISHING INDUSTRY.
Although there are various principles for fisheries 
management applied in different regions of the world the 
following principles are hereby proposed for consideration in 
a Namibian fisheries management policy.
1. The policies for regulating 9 fisheries.
2. Data needs and a fishery information system.
3. Conservation.
4. Namibian interest.
5. The Namibian population.
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1.
Setting management objectives is one thing and achieving 
those objectives another and therefore it is necessary for the 
fishery authorities to examine the various methods whereby 
they can regulate a fishery. The productivity of a fishery is 
related to the following variables.
a) The growth rate of the fish or annual increment to the 
stock.
b) Recruitment into the fishery by reproduction, migration 
or the young fish entering the stock each year.
c) Natural mortality of the fish or annual deaths occurring 
from natural causes such as diseases, predation, etc.
d) Fishing mortality or the annual deaths from fishing 
equals the annual catch.
Recruitment and growth causes the fish to increase 
whereas deaths from natural causes and fish recruitment causes 
the fish stocks to decrease. Over natural deaths and the rate 
of recruitment into the stock we have no control. However we 
are able to a certain degree to control the fishing mortality 
by controlling the fishing effort and productivity by 
regulating the age at which fish enter the exploited phase of 
the fishery. All fishing regulatory schemes therefore fall 
within two basic methods of regulation namely those to control 
the rate of fishing and those to control the age at which the 
fish may be exploited and can thus be set out as follows.
THE POLICIES FOR REGULATING A FISHERY.
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1.1 Controlling the fishing effeort, access or the rate of 
fishing by:
1.1.1 Catch limitations.
1.1.2 Controlling the fishing effort.
1.1.3 Reducing fishing time by the introduction of fishing 
seasons or limiting the time at sea.
1.1.4 Declaring protected areas.
1.2. Controlling the age or average size of the fish caught 
by: ^
1.2.1 Minimum mesh size regulations.
1.2.2 Fish size limitations or minimum landing sizes.
1.2.3 Closed areas.
The abovementioned management methods will now be briefly 
discussed in turn and it must be further borne in mind that 
both methods are complementary to each other and not mutually 
exclusive.
1.1 Controlling the fishing effort, access or the rate of 
fishing.
1.1.1 Catch limitations.
Catches can be limited by the setting of annual TAC's and 
the introduction of quotas either annually or seasonally for 
regulating the fishery. The fishing effort is thus stopped 
when the annual TAC and quotas are filled. However this method 
does not lend precise control over the fishing and gives no 
consideration to the fleet size and the fishing methods 
employed.
29
1.1.2 Controlling the fishing effort.
This regulation is aimed at limiting the entry of 
manpower and number of vessels into the fishing grounds. 
Controlling the fishing intensity is necessary in order to 
prevent the overexpansion of the fleet and overinvestment. 
With this method, restrictions are placed on manpower and 
number of fishing vessels or the fishing gear which may enter 
a fishery based on biological, economic, social and political 
consideration.. In order to benefit from this method there has 
to be precise limits placed on those fishing vessels granted 
access and these limitations must be strictly enforced. 
Overexploitation can therefore only be prevented through 
strict enforcement to prevent illegal fishing. The fishing 
effort or intensity is thus the result of all the fishing 
activities whether legal or illegal. A method of reducing 
excess capacity in a fishery can be done by criteria such as 
vessel age discrimination or government buyback incentives for 
scrapping aged vessels. Controlling the fishing effort can 
also be used as a means of increasing local participation in 
the fishery without increasing TAC’s and vessel capacity.
1.1.3 Control of fishing time or seasons.
By limiting the fishing to specific times, e.g., number 
of days per week a reduction in the fishing effort can be 
achieved. Although, such a method could increase the cost of 
fishing as fishermen are not ensured of cost effective catches 
and some fishing grounds may be far away from shore. This 
method should therefore only be used where an urgent need 
exists to immediately reduce the fishing effort due to 
depleted stocks.* Specific seasons during the course of the
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year may also be introduced for specific species according to 
times and areas determined by the authorities.
1.1.4 Protected areas.
Closing of specific areas fjrom fishing during periods 
when the fish are in specific stages of their development and 
are regarded as juveniles or to protect certain scarce species 
from extinction. Where these sanctuaries^or spawning 
grounds are closed juvenile fish will be protected until such 
time that they have sufficiently matured to become 
commercially exploitable.- This method can however result in 
the overstocking of fish in the sanctuary areas and 
understocking in unprotected areas and is therefore a rather 
imprecise method of protection. Despite this limitation, 
protected areas have their advantages since they provide 
breeding and nursery grounds for juvenile fish. Stocks of 
fish within these sanctuaries could migrate when they are 
mature to replenish those exploited areas.
1.2. Controlling the age or the average size of the fish
caught.
1.2.1 Mesh size regulations.
Traditionally mesh size regulations are one of the 
principle methods employed in controlling the pattern of 
fishing mortality. The principle behind this method is the 
idea that the bigger, the larger the mesh sizes the more 
infant fish can escape the nets and thus grow to become larger 
more mature fish that can contribute to the biomass of the 
fish stock in later years. The reasons behind the
31
introduction of mesh regulations is to protect undersized fish 
from cultivation and also as a method of conservation since 
small fish later discarded are of no use once they are already 
dead. Various problems however occur with the introduction of 
mesh size regulations. Specific mesh sizes may cause 
considerable problems ' in a multi-species fishery such as 
exists in countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. 
However mesh size regulations can be an effective method of 
control and conservation especially in a single species 
directed fishery. Another problem for consideration is the 
ability to convince fishermen of the long term benefits of 
mesh size regulation and consultation with fishermen is thus 
necessary as, it is easy for fishermen to bypass mesh size 
regulations in a number of ways. In addition to the above it 
is also necessary to prohibit the carrying of nets of more 
than one mesh size. By prohibiting the carrying of nets of 
more than one mesh size on a given voyage and by relating the 
permitted species composition of the landings to the mesh size 
of the nets carried fishermen would be encouraged to carry the 
mesh appropriate to the species to which they were directing 
their fishing effort.
1.2.2 Fish size limitations or minimum landing sizes.
Placing limitations on the size of fish per species that 
may be caught or landed has basically the same objective as 
the other methods of conservation such as minimum mesh sizes, 
seasonally closed areas, by catch limits etc. namely to 
prevent or minimize the catches of small or juvenile, immature 
fish. By placing limits on the size of fish that may be caught 
or landed, it is aimed to direct fishermen towards the 
catching of fish that have reached a certain growth or 
maturity. This method is directly linked to mesh size
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limitations and it's accompanying problems when fishing for 
demersal fish which consist of a mixture of species for each 
of which the optimum mesh size is different.
The minimum landing size of fish is the same as fish size 
limitations and has as it's objectives:
(1) To reinforce minimum mesh sizes by making it not 
worthwhile for fishermen to use undersized meshes to 
catch fish which cannot be landed and
(2) To deter fishermen from fishing in areas where small, 
juvenile fish predominate.
Minimum landing sizes however, leads to waste as small, 
undersized fish caught are discarded and there is no guarantee 
that small fish once caught and discarded will survive. This 
defeats the objectives of conservation. However by regulating 
the landing sizes of fish fishermen are encouraged to fish in 
those areas where mature, larger fish predominate as it 
becomes uneconomical for them to fish in areas where small 
fish are in abundance. ,
1.2.3 Closed areas.
Prohibiting fishing in areas where small fish predominate 
remains one of the most effective methods of minimizing the 
capture of small undersized fish. There are however, many 
problems associated with this method.(See Chapter A 3) One of 
the advantages of this method of conservation is however that 
it facilitates surveillance since those areas are closed to 
any fishing and any fishing activity in those areas 
automatically become a punishable offence and violations by 
fishermen are unlikely.
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The choice of a regulatory method.
The choice of a regulatory method should take into 
consideration biological, economic, social and political 
factors existing within a fishery- The more difficult it is to 
enforce a particular method the less effective it is and the 
less likely it is to succeed compared with methods that are 
less efficient but more easily enforceable. It is imperative 
to discuss regulatory methods with fishermen before 
implementation in order to ensure their cooperation. 
Fishermen are more likely to abide by rules and regulations 
which they understand and regard as fair. Once convinced that 
these regulatory and conservation methods of fish stocks are 
to their own future benefit the more willing they may be to 
comply with them and would even be willing to help in their 
enforcement by reporting violators. Self policing by fishermen 
would furthermore facilitate enforcement by the authorities.
MECHANISMS FOR CONTROLLING THE FISHING EFFORT.
The Indo Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC) in 1987 
suggested three approaches applicable to multi-species 
fisheries that governments may use to control the fishing 
effort directly or indirectly.
a) License limits.
This is a most direct method of controlling the fishing 
effort as the scheme licenses units of effort and limits the 
number of licenses granted. Three major tasks are involved in 
this scheme. (1) License the number of fishing units in terms 
of the number of vessels, tonnage, engine power, fishing
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gear, number of fishermen etc.(2) Determine the optimum number 
of vessels to be licensed per stock and per quota this should 
be determined in light of the TAC and other information 
available. (3) Allocate the licenses using different criteria 
as determined by the individual abilities such as the number 
of years fishing, dependence on fishing as a livelihood, 
fishing skills, nationality etc... The issue of the 
transferability of the license should also be addressed.
b) Economic controls.
License limits to prevent an overcapacity in the fishing 
effort especially in the case of large scale operations 
through government incentives, e.g., compensation to induce 
the retirement of elderly and inefficient vessels, or through 
encouragement of new industries through soft loans and other 
techniques to attract fishermen to other activities.
c) Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFS)
This would be more appropriate to small scale fishing 
communities in nearshore areas, lagoons and reefs. This is a 
method whereby tenure is granted over certain areas of the 
resource to the local community which indirectly, control 
fishing effort by self regulation and rationalizes the fishery 
as most small scale fishing communities have a sense of 
territoriality.
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2. DATA NEEDS AND A FISHERY INFORMATION SERVICE.
2.1 Acquisition of information; data needs and a fishery
information system.
a) Infoinnation is needed for management.
It is clearly necessary to have information available in 
order to attain the objectives of management, namely to 
produce the maximum benefits from a fishery and to allocate 
these benefits. The gathering of the right information will 
allow the decisions to be specifically designed to reach these 
objectives. Thus, unless information is collected and 
analyzed, those who should benefit from the resource are most 
likely to receive no benefits or receive far less then what 
they expected.
b) The type of information that is needed.
All types of information relative to production and the 
allocation of benefits should be gathered and analyzed by 
those responsible for management. Information should not only 
be sought with regard to biological data and physical measures 
such as catch, effort by area and species used for biological 
modelling, but also information on the economic and social 
factors of the fishery. As information is not cost free it is 
suggested that the information that is sought is relative to 
the benefits produced and therefore management should observe 
the economic principle of marginal returns and the cost of 
information.
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c) Data needs for stock assessment and a fishery information 
system.
Data is needed for stock assessment and the determination 
of TAG'S through methods such as the following;
c.l. Routine statistics of:
Production. Data should be gathered on the harvest by area and 
catch on a monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly or annual basis and 
comprehensively summarized annually by species or groups of 
species, by fishing gear, by .sector (e.g. nearshore/offshore - 
artisinal/commercial) and also by area division.
Fishing effort. Information should further be gathered and 
summarized annually in terms of the number of fishing vessels, 
number of trips, etc.. Monthly,.bi-monthly or quarterly data 
with annual summaries in terms of the number of days fished, 
hours fished, number of hauls and the type of gear, by sector 
and by the area of subdivision.
Value of landings. ' Monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly catch 
value information should be gathered with annual summaries ,by 
species, by fishing gear, by sector and by area,subdivision.
C.2. Research data on:
Other landing data. Species composition by gear, sector and 
size, composition by key species and by gear; catch 
information by length and weight of selected species.
Biological data. Food habits by selected species to estimate 
the food chain linkage. Otolith samples by key species to
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determine age composition of the catch samples, age at first 
capture, growth and mortality. Ground samples by key species 
to determine age at first maturity. Migration data by selected 
pelagic species to determine migration and the stock structure 
and to estimate growth and mortality.
Survey data. Species distribution by key species, by depth, 
size and fishing ground. Eggs and larvae distribution by 
species, depth and area. Biomass and catch per unit effort 
estimates by key species or species groups, depth zones, area 
and key fishing gear.
Other data. Selectivity of mesh size, primary productivity, 
chemical oceanography, pollution etc.
3. PRINCIPLES FOR A NAMIBIAN FISHING INDUSTRY.
3.1 CONSERVATION.
Due to the early exploitation of and virtual extinction 
of certain species and fish stocks the Namibian government 
should adopt policies of conservation and conservatism as 
regards it's fish resources. There is furthermore a need to 
base management on a sound scientific basis as the scientific 
component represents a 'rational' element in the politics 
involved in resource management. Scientific advice and 
collaboration on data collecting, stock assessment and catch 
predictions are essential in the decision making process.' It 
is however, realized that scientific advice and information 
are not the only factors determining management policy, but 
even so, they at least form the necessary basis for such a 
policy. The principle method employed for the conservation of 
fish stocks in any given area is to control the amount of fish 
landed from each stock year by year by the fleets granted
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access to the area and to control the fishing methods 
employed. However, where fish are not landed at the national 
harbours, other methods of control must be employed. It 
remains extremely difficult to precisely determine catches of 
foreign access fleets.
Central to the concept of conservation is the 
establishment of a Total Allowable Catch or TAC. The quantity 
of fish that may be caught within a given year is called the 
TAC. The foreign fleets granted access and the national fleet 
participating in the fishery for each species is allocated a 
proportion or percentage of the TAC as a quota. In order to 
achieve conservation, the TAC, the national quotas need to be 
set before the start of the fishing season in each particular 
year. The national enforcement agencies then attempt to ensure 
that national quotas are not exceeded during the season in a 
particular year. In order to set a TAC and to determine the 
quotas it is necessary to predict the catches or how the 
fisheries will perform. Furthermore in order to predict the 
catches the current state of the stock must be known. 
Fisheries scientist employ a procedure known as "stock 
assessment" to determine the current state of the stock. 
Included in this procedure is allowance for the estimation of 
the historical state of the stock to which the present 
estimated state is then compared. The procedure giving rise to 
scientific proposals for the determination of the TAC can be 
summarized as;
1) Performing a stock assessment and hence determining the 
historical, and present state of the stock.
2) Making a range of catch predictions through simulation of 
the way the-fishery may perform in the year for which the 
TAC is applied.
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3) Selecting one of the predictions as being the most viable
in view of the current state of the stock.
Such predictions may be made for years into the future 
and although various difficulties, both practical and 
theoretical may occur, such long term predictions are used as 
a means of indicating long term objectives for stock 
conservation. Stock assessment on the other hand is the 
procedure by which the fisheries scientists estimate the 
historical and current state of the stock in order to help 
determine the TAG. The basic enquiry is; "How many fish of 
each age are currently in the sea ? How heavily are they 
exploited and how does stock and exploitation levels compare 
with historical values ?" The answers to these questions can 
be obtained through the analysis of the appropriate data.
One should bear in mind that scientific advice is merely 
quantative advice which can often be very wrong and therefore 
a conservative policy should be adopted to allow for a certain 
margin of error. A margin of 20 % less than the scientific 
advice can be regarded as reasonably safe in the determination 
of the TAG for a given year^"*^. This percentage may be 
regarded as arbitrary by industry but could be justified in 
terms of policy for the long term recovery of stocks and 
conservation due to inadequate surveillance and monitoring 
capability.
3.2 THE NAMIBIAN INTEREST.
The interest of the Namibian people should be safeguarded 
through the formulation of realistic policies that are 
implemented by an efficient, well managed administrative
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structure. Realistic and obtainable objectives should be set 
and balanced with a pragmatic and cost effective 
administrative structure. The Namibian interest in a complex 
industry such as fisheries can only be obtained and 
safeguarded through the efficiency of the administration and 
the control of management over the resources. The most 
effective way in which the Namibian interest can be secured is 
through a system of controls which determines and regulates a)
Access to the resource.
b) Agreements with foreign countries.
3.3 THE INTEREST OF THE NAMIBIAN POPULATION.
It is a well known fact that the prosperity and success 
of any venture is largely dependent upon the efficiency and 
effectiveness of it's management. As fish is a natural living 
resource and vulnerable not only to human exploitation but 
also to natural and environmental variables it should be 
safeguarded against present and future overexploitation as it 
is only over the human' activities that we have control. 
Fishery exploitation should therefore be done in a sustainable 
manner. Proper management of the resource is essential in 
order to obtain the maximum benefits. The success of 
management can therefore be measured against the benefits 
accruing to the population as a whole as part of the country s 
social objectives. More specifically the interest of the 
Namibian people is expressly safeguarded in Chapter 2, Article 
95 (1) of the Namibian Constitution which provides that the 
natural resources of the country should be exploited in such a 
manner as to benefit the population as a whole. It is 
therefore the duty of government to manage and administer the 
fishery resources in a sustainable way and to especially aim
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at practical measures to ensure maximum participation by 
nationals in the fishery sector in the form of employment both 
offshore and onshore. Maximum employment on board fishing 
vessels by locals and in processing will go a long way to 
achieve national objectives. The industry should be directed 
towards the creation and supply of local markets. Through 
marketing strategies and awareness programs fish as a source 
of food should be promoted in Namibia as it has the potential 
to significantly contribute towards food self sufficiency.
PART TWO.
POSSIBLE CRITERIA FOR A NAMIBIAN FISHERIES POLICY.
A) CONSERVATION.
Two main types of conservation methods namely, 
regulations, either directly or indirectly as a means of 
conservation and secondly conservation through a management 
system of tag's and guotas shall be discussed here.
1) Direct Regulation.
Through direct regulation an administration aims to limit 
the rate of fishing within it's own area of jurisdiction that 
is within it's EEZ. Direct regulation therefore aims to limit 
all those factors which influence the total fishing capacity. 
It may furthermore place restrictions and limitations on 
factors such as the number of vessels and fishermen that are 
allowed to fish within a given period, the engine power of the 
vessels, the number of days that they are allowed to spend at 
sea fishing, the type of gear that may be employed, ancillary
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equipment such as radar, sonar, etc.that may be used, 
designating of fishing areas and the banning of fishing 
activities in other areas such as spawning grounds . The 
administration, through these measures, limits those factors 
which increases the efficiency of the vessels. This is however 
difficult to achieve as the tasks involved are complicated for 
any given administration since it abounds with various 
political difficulties related to it's attempt to limit the 
freedom of entry into the fishery. Regulating the size and 
structure of commercial fishing fleets presents new and often 
awkward problems for policy makers. First of all, it presents 
various economical problems such as per unit returns on 
investments and therefore calls for some understanding of 
economic analysis. But, it also requires an appreciation of 
biological problems in fisheries management as well as the 
legal, institutional and social constraints and possibilities 
within a region. The main aim for limitations on the rate of 
fishing is to protect stocks from overexploitation which 
remains an important purpose of regulation and conservation. 
The task is thus to design institutional arrangements for 
controlling and regulating fishing capacities in line with the 
productive capacity of the fish stock.
2) Indirect Regulation.
The rate of fishing can be regulated by limiting the 
total catches from a fish stock. If the number of fish in 
different year -classes and the average weight of each group 
is known, then the total weight of fish which can be caught 
for a given fishing mortality rate can be calculated and the 
TAC fixed. If this catch is then fixed as a TAG, and it is 
caught exactly as determined during a fishing period or year, 
then, the target rate of fishing will have been achieved.
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However very often, deta is only available to calculate the 
rate of fishing on the stock but not the data of the catches 
which correspond to the specific rate of fishing. The reasons 
for this- are twofold. It may not be possible to determine the 
age of the targeted fish which is essential in calculating the 
TAC corresponding to the different rates of fishing. Or the 
data may simply not be available. In such cases the TAC at the 
level of the average catch should maintain the present rate of 
fishing assuming that recruitment also remains at average 
levels. TAG'S fixed and calculated in this manner may be 
called "precautionary TAC's".
It must be further borne in mind that because all 
fisheries for demersal species, catch a variety of species due 
to the size of the nets used and it is therefore virtually 
impossible for an administration to ensure that fishermen 
exhaust all their quotas for all species simultaneously. 
Fishermen may therefore continue to fish in a given area until 
such time that they have exhausted all their quotas resulting 
in having to discard catches of those species for which their 
quotas are already filled.
It should be further noted that selecting an appropriate 
TAC for a given season or year depends on short and long term 
predictions of the stocks. The appropriateness of a 
TAC depends on two major considerations namely:
a) What is the current state of the stock compared to 
it's historical state.
b) Is it possible to exploit the stock in a more rational 
manner.
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To answer these two questions obviously depends on our 
perception of the current state of the stock, compared to it's 
historical status as well as on the ability to predict long 
term possibilities. Since each stock has its own history, it's 
potential for more rational exploitation may also be differ 
from that of others. There is no universal answer to the above 
questions and this is the reason why management advice is 
given with reference to individual stocks. It is also 
important to investigate those environmental factors affecting 
the stocks in order to make predictions on the state of the 
stocks and to set the value of the TAG's.
B) THE TYPE OF QUOTA/ TAG MANAGEMENT.
1> No Regulation.
Glearly any system of fishing privileges that fails to 
regulate either the number of vessels that may fish or their 
individual catches is inadequate. Therefore any fishing system
Iwhich uses a system of unrestricted licenses fails in it's 
management objectives. Unrestricted licenses is a system that 
does not limit entry into a fishery.' Unrestricted licenses is 
a traditional form of granting access but has now become 
almost extinct and remains in only a very few minor and 
underutilized fisheries under a system of selected species 
licenses. Such a system obviously has many disadvantages and 
undermines the principle of sustainable resource management 
and has the following adverse effects thereon. First of all, 
it allows fishing capacity to expand excessively and 
prejudices resource management. It furthermore undermines the 
future economic security of the fishermen and eliminates the 
scope for public revenues. Last, but not the least, such a
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system leads to heavy administrative burdens and enforcement 
requirements for in order to conserve stocks from being 
exploited by overexpanded fleets, the fishing gear, fishing 
times and the methods employed need to be highly regulated.
2) (Periodical) Quotas.
Once the fishery authorities have established a TAG for a 
fish stock it is then divided into a number of quotas which 
are allocated according to pre-determined criteria among the 
application. These may be called quota licenses and the 
represent a method whereby individual or groups of fishermen 
are authorised to harvest specific quantities of fish of a 
given species. This system is basically the same as that used 
to regulate other renewable natural resources such as water 
rights, timber cutting and grazing rights. The administrative 
authority may issue licenses that authorize the use of a 
specific amount of the resource and the total amount licensed 
is constrained to the total recoverable yield of the resource. 
Thus the total amount of all the individual quotas for a 
specific period equals the established TAG for that given 
period. The advantage of this approach is that it eliminates 
the basic cause for fleet overcapacity in the fishing industry 
by removing the incentives of the individual fishermen to 
protect and increase their share of the catch. This system 
therefore, rather than encouraging fishermen to increase their 
fishing capability, encourages them instead to adapt their 
vessels, gear and methods to take the licensed catch at the 
lowest possibl.e cost. Other advantages of this quota 
licensing system have been held to be the following:
a) "It provides a direct means of controlling the total 
catch and ensuring that it will be within the sustained yield 
targets set for the stocks.
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b) It frees the regulatory authorities from many of the 
problems associated with regulating fishing activity. Some 
controls on fishing would obviously still be required for 
biological reasons. But, with the total catch controlled by 
licenses, most of the restrictions on vessels, gear and 
fishing time that are now used to prevent overfishing would 
become unnecessary.c) It adds to the security of fishermen and eliminates 
much of the risk they otherwise face about their catch.
d) It can accommodate changes in economic conditions 
without disruptive effect's notably, if fish prices rise or 
for some other reason the fishery becomes more profitable, 
earnings will increase, but there, will not be an automatic
tendency to expand fishing capacity.
e) It lends itself to a variety of methods for raising 
revenues in the form of license fees and landing charges,
f) It is, in principle at least, administratively simple. 
And, because it deals directly with the problem of regulating 
the catch, once licenses are issued the regulatory authorities 
can concentrate on resource management rather than on 
regulating the fleets fishing activities
C) NAMIBIAN INTEREST.
1) Through access to the resource.
Priority should be given to Namibian companies, fishermen 
and other national interest groups when allocating access to 
the living marine■resources within the Namibian EEZ. The main 
reasons why priority should be granted to nationals is that 
this first of all provides a sense of security to local 
fishermen, secondly, catches are landed at local ports and
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processing locally is facilitated, and finally, administrative 
control and costs are minimized. Only in the case where the 
established criteria for allocation of quotas and licenses 
such as inability to harvest the resource, inadequate local 
processing capability should access be considered for foreign 
participation. The landing of catches locally provides a 
better form of management and administrative control. An 
additional advantage is that vessels operating out of local 
ports uses other ancillary services with the accompanying 
financial benefits. Where foreign vessels operate in a coastal 
state EEZ it is very seldom, if at all that they land their 
catches locally as they either sail for foreign ports or 
tranship their catches at sea. This presents accompanying 
problems of control for the authorities.
2) Through agreement with foreign nations.
j.
t
Through agreement with foreign nations to harvest the 
excess quotas the government can ensure that the determined 
TAC for a particular period is filled. The various methods 
that could be employed by the government to grant access to 
foreign fleets is discussed elsewhere.(See Chapter 4). The 
granting of access to foreign fleets to harvest the excess is 
a means whereby the government levies a fee on each operating 
vessel. Access fees are essentially a form of taxation which 
are designed to:
(1) Extract a resource rent from the fishery;
(2) Foster operational efficiency in the use of the 
resource and;
(3) Provide an instr\ament by which the government can 
regulate, develop, conserve and manage the fishery.
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The disadvantage of the system of access fees is that the 
burden of paying the fees can be avoided by fishermen by 
opting not to fish in areas where fees are payable or 
operating illegally in areas where the payment of the fees are 
mandatory. However by imposing harsh fines for illegal fishing 
fishermen will be discouraged to operate illegally as they 
will not be prepared to face the financial burden. Fees should 
however, be realistic and be related to the use made of the. 
resource by the individual fisherman per period of time. It 
is furthermore advisable that the government should adopt a 
strict policy of access fees payment and should avoid in kind 
subsidies or other forms of aid in the form of other goods and 
services as an alternative to the payment of access fees. The 
main reasons for this statement are that first of all in kind 
subsidies or aid confuses the issues for fisheries development 
Secondly experiences elsewhere in Africa has proven that such 
arrangements are likely to lead to poor compliance and 
unfeasible projects.(See Chapter 4)
D) THE INTEREST OP THE NAMIBIAN POPULATION.
1) Employment.
The Namibian government in it's White Paper on fishing 
policy dated August 1991 committed itself to conserve and 
manage the national resources to the benefit of the Namibian 
people. The exploitation of the marine living resources 
should however be geared towards the creation of more 
employment opportunities in the fisheries sector. Not only 
should the stake of the national fishermen in the allocation 
of quotas be increased but continuously evaluated both in the 
short, medium and long term in accordance with' local
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capability but the employment of nationals on foreign fleets 
should form part of the terms of access to these foreign 
fleets. However, strict compliance with such conditions should 
be ensured through administrative measures and legal 
safeguards as it is easy to find loopholes in agreements which 
are poorly worded. Methods of avoiding such provisions in 
agreements has been perfected in .access agreements elsewhere 
where payoffs and bribery are the order of the day.
Access agreements should furthermore specifically provide 
for the training of nationals on board foreign vessels. This 
type of on the job training should be geared towards providing 
locals with the neccesary skills and expertise for the future 
that will enable us to provide our own manpower in the 
exploitation of our resources. Employment in areas such as 
processing should also be given serious priority together with 
a policy to expand present processing capability.
2) Expansion of local markets.
It is indeed ironic that a country with such vast fish 
resources has such a low fish consumption. More than 98% of 
the fish harvested in the Namibian EEZ is for export to 
foreign markets. With the current drought facing the country 
it has become imperative that the traditional dependence on 
agricultural products such as wheat, maze and meat be 
substituted through the promotion of local fish consumption. 
There exists a definite need to promote the local market for 
fish and fish products as an alternative source of food of 
high nutritional value. Through government and private sector 
initiatives and promotional programs such as education and 
advertisement the nutritional value of fish and fish products 
as a source of food should be promoted amongst the Namibian
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population. Programs should be developed to create an 
awareness of the value of fish as a source of food whereby the 
local markets can be developed and extended. Promotional 
programs will therefore play an important role in the domestic 
awareness of the value of fish and subsequently in the 
domestic demand for fish and fish products.
This is however no small task since high value fish is 
certain to fetch higher prices on foreign markets and form an 
important percentage to the national income. However a policy 
whereby bycatches (with restrictions) of less- valuable species 
are locally landed should be investigated to supply such an 
expanded local market. The benefits of this would be twofold 
namely; it will provide an additional source of food and 
secondly it will limit the discard of catches and subsequently 
the waste of the resource since discards once dead at present 
have no value.
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ENDNOTES.
CHAPTER 2
Lee G. Anderson, p. 462 para. 1 
See Chapter 6 (C) 1.P108.
Sanctuaries needs to be scientifically justified and 
designated
This is my ovm estimation and is regarded as reasonable 
as a safety measure for conservation and stock recovery.
H.Pearse p. 252, para.5.
CHAF»TER 3
REGULATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Section 4, article 62 of the Law of the Sea Convention 
deals almost exclusively with the regulatory powers of the 
coastal state within it's EEZ. The coastal state can 
prescribe and impose regulations in respect of foreign 
fishermen within it's area of jurisdiction. In respect of 
it's own nationals the coastal state may exercise unlimited 
legislative and administrative jurisdiction. The coastal 
state may therefore impose whatever regulations and 
conditions it may deem fit on its own fisherman. However in 
exercising it's jurisdictional powers in achieving management 
objectives the coastal state is limited by the provisions of 
Article 61 of the Convention which provides as follows:
a) To ensure that the living resources in the EEZ are not 
endangered by over-exploitation by taking into account 
the best scientific evidence available.
b) That measures of conservation and management are 
designed to maintain and restore the fish stocks at 
levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield 
as qualified by the relevant economic and environmental 
factors.
Paragraph 4 of article 62 provides a list of the types 
or kinds of regulations, laws, terms and conditions which the 
coastal state may prescribe for the purposes of cons.ervation
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and management, and more specifically, as regards the 
regulation of access of foreign vessels in the coastal states 
EEZ- There are thus two kinds of regulatory powers envisaged 
by paragraph 4, namely the prescription of conservation and 
management measures and the terms and conditions of access to 
foreign vessels. The coastal state has therefore the right to 
regulate foreign fishing activity within it's EEZ but subject 
to certain constraints. The coastal state's right to regulate 
both for it's own national and foreign fishermen will be 
discussed together as applying to both, with regard to the
various measures that could be adopted. These measures and
techniques will be briefly discussed here. But the 
discussion is limited to those regulatory methods
traditibnally employed to control the harvest levels or the 
quantity of some or all of the inputs or effort. A
discussion on the economic profit equation or prices received 
for the selling of fish or paid for the inputs is not
addressed because of the limited scope of the paper. This 
chapter is furthermore limited to those regulations which are 
designed to protect selected portions of the fish populations 
and which may or may not result in the overall reduction of 
the catch.
These measures are divided into two categories namely 
those regulations which are most general and do not restrict 
access and secondly those measures which deal with access and 
which are aimed at the limitation or the reduction of the 
total catch or fishing effort. The measures that do not 
restrict access are:
1) Mesh size regulations;
2) Regulations of the size limit of fish;
3) Establishment of fishing seasons and areas; and
4) Regulation of total catch by species.
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The measures that restrict access directly or indirectly are:
1) Limiting the number of vessels and gear required to 
harvest the total allowable catch; and
2) Indirect methods of licensing, quotas and taxation or 
royalties.
A) REGULATORY METHODS THAT DO NOT DEAL WITH ACCESS.
1) MESH SIZE REGULATIONS.
Mesh size regulations were originally designed and 
introduced because there was . general agreement that young 
fish had to be protected. A further reason was the general 
destructive and indiscriminate nature of net trawl fishing 
methods. The purpose of controlling the size of meshes on 
trawlers was based on the assumption that size limitations 
would permit the escape of smaller, younger fish of a certain 
size and age in order for them to grow into larger, mature 
adult fish that could be exploited later. The mesh size is 
thus directly related to the size of the fish which is aimed 
to be caught. It has however remained difficult to determine 
biologically exactly when fish have reached a mature age due 
to a lack of information on the stocks. Secondly there are no 
guarantees that young fish will reach maturity and be 
exploited. Various factors such as natural fish mortality or 
adverse environmental conditions can be attributed for this 
uncertainty. Mesh size limitations have the further
disadvantage that in actual trawl operations more than one 
species of varying size and age may be taken in the same 
operation. Mesh size regulations are therefore fraught, 
despite their wide applications in fisheries globally, with 
certain . obvious flaws and are difficult to enforce.
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Fishermen's ingenuity has devised various illegal methods for 
non compliance with mesh size regulations as -it is very easy 
for them to change the nets or reduce the mesh sizes by 
inserting additional pieces of net in the cod-end and to 
attach them in such a manner that they are easily removed.
2) REGULATING THE RETENTION SIZE OF FISH CAUGHT.
The purpose of regulating the retention size of fish 
caught is basically the same as mesh size limitations and 
provides a direct deterrent for the retention of fish under a 
specified size. The objectives are the same namely the 
prevention or minimization of catches of small fish. Minimum 
catch size of fish may however discourage but not necessarily 
prevent the capture of undersized fish. This regulation does 
not therefore effectively prevent capture but merely 
determines the landing size of the fish caught. Fish caught 
which are under the landing size are of necessity discarded 
as they become unprofitable to the fisherman. This regulation 
may thus be counterproductive and negate the conservation 
objective since there is no guarantee that undersized fish 
caught and discarded will survive and continue to add to the 
biomass. When fish sizes are .limited there is no incentive 
fishermen to retain undersized fish caught and hauls may 
include substantial quantities of undersized fish most of 
which may already be dead when discarded. Furthermore 
fishermen themselves may have little reason to keep 
undersized catches since they may have little value or 
because bigger fish is required for production of e.g. frozen 
products or they may not want to risk having to pay fines for 
undersized landings. It would therefore make sense to adopt 
flexible regulations whereby not all undersized catches are 
discarded. These initiatives may include the sale of
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undersized catches on the local markets or by making 
allowance that a certain percentage of the catch may be 
undersized etc. It is however important that limitations be 
placed on the by catches and in addition to providing for the 
local markets by catches are valuable for scientific 
analysis.
3) REGULATING CLOSED AREAS AND SEASONS.
The closing of certain areas and seasonal closures may 
be introduced for specific times of the year for specific 
species and may further pertain to all or specified areas. 
Fishing seasons can thus be introduced for different species 
at varying times of the year and certain specified periods 
when all fishing is prohibited. Furthermore specified areas 
may be seasonally , permanently or partially closed to 
fishing activity. The purpose of this regulation is to 
protect those areas where small fish predominate in order to 
prevent the capture of small and undersized fish. Seasonal 
and area closures on certain fisheries may be introduced to 
protect nursery areas and spawning grounds also to prevent 
conflict between e.g.,. artisinal and commercial fisheries. 
There are however certain problems that arise out of seasonal 
and area closures. Where small fish are in abundance in near 
coastal areas which are closed, fishermen with short range 
vessel capabilities are prejudiced as they are unable to 
catch farther offshore. Secondly a. valuable fishery may co­
exist in the same area as small fish and consequently this 
reduces the effectiveness of closure. Closed areas and 
seasons may on the other hand facilitate surveillance as they 
prohibit any vessel activity and are therefore one of the 
easier regulations to enforce. Furthermore time and seasonal 
closure may be introduced, not necessarily to protect target
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stocks, but for the purpose of minimizing the accidental 
catch of certain species.
4) REGULATION OF THE TOTAL CATCH BY SPECIES.
Regulation of the total catch by species is the most 
direct and commonly used method of controlling cultivation of 
a specific species or stock. This regulation determines the 
total quota or catch for a specific species. Species may 
however very often consist of more than one stock and 
therefore the total catch by species or stock may further be 
determined by way of regional allocation. Total quotas or 
catch for a fishery as a whole have an indirect effect on the 
effort and input usage as the individual catches of fishermen 
will be limited by the combined catch of the entire fleet. 
Total catch by species regulations has originally been 
considered as amongst the easier component to measure in 
fisheries data. This is however only the case where the fish 
is locally landed and weighed. Estimating the catches of 
distant water fleets and factory ships, or where 
transshipment takes place at sea is much more difficult to 
determine. These vessels in most instances never provide 
accurate data on the type of fish caught, the quantity 
caught or discarded.
There is therefore very little or no accountability for 
catches by these vessels as this data is extremely difficult 
to determine. Further problems arise namely that fishermen 
are reluctant to accurately report the exact amount or 
location of catches due to the competitive nature of the 
fisheries industry. This applies whether the total catches 
are regulated or not. However if the limits placed on 
catches are not vigorously controlled, monitored and enforced
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there is bound to be inaccurate reporting of catches and 
discards. In addition to the underlogging of catches, 
undersized, undesirable and even prohibited species may also 
be discarded in order to maximize catches under a mixed 
species quota. The accuracy of catch reports are difficult to 
assess even with the most efficient surveillance and 
monitoring schemes and methods. Thus the magnitude of error 
in reporting cannot be accurately evaluated.
B) REGULATORY METHODS THAT DEAL WITH ACCESS
1) DIRECT CURTAILMENT BY REGULATING THE SIZE OF FISHING 
VESSELS AND GEAR,
Regulating the size of fishing vessels and gear has 
become a widely used method to curtail the fishing effort. By 
placing restrictive measures on the size of vessels and gear 
the harvesting capacity of the allowable catch is controlled. 
This method may be employed to determine the type and size of 
vessels that may enter a fishery and also the type of gear 
that may be used. In most developed fisheries there exists 
an overcapacity of fishing vessels. This situation arises as 
a .consequence of market demands and the common property 
nature of the fisheries resources. It has thus been thought 
that in order to prevent the overexploitation of the marine 
living resources within a fishery and to control market 
prices, that the size and the number of vessels to enter the 
fishery should be restricted, the capacity limited and the 
type of gear to be employed specified^ If the resources were 
not of a common property nature, but privately owned instead 
then^ the harvesting strategy employed would be to minimize 
cost and maximize long term yields and profits. If this was
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the case there would be little need for regulations and 
governmental infrastructure. However since fisheries are 
publicly owned there is a need for control and regulation to 
prevent overharvesting and possible extinction of the
resource. More entrants into a fishery with a fixed TAC 
requires a corresponding decrease in the catch per vessel, a 
lower per dollar return of all operating costs and a shorter 
fishing season as apparent consequences. This scheme for 
controlling the fishing effort or harvesting capacity has 
been introduced in a number of fisheries around the world. 
Restrictive regulations on the type of fishing gear are aimed 
at reducing the efficiency -of the fishing unit and thereby 
reducing the size and quantity of the catches. It must
however, be borne in mind that regulating the size of
commercial fishing vessels, as with most gear regulations, 
simply increases the operating cost of a fishery and puts 
them at a disadvantage when competing with fish and fish
products from another region. Restricting the type of gear 
used in harvesting operations remains however a universally 
acceptable method of control. The reasons why these measures 
became acceptable are mostly due to social considerations. 
Control over the type of gear became necessary as highly 
efficient gear may lead to the overexploitation of the fish 
resources especially in a highly localized area even though 
it is recognized that gear restrictions reduce efficiency in 
the taking of catches and thus increases operational cost. 
There are two main reasons why restrictions are placed on 
fishing gear in certain areas, namely the highly efficient 
nature of certain types of gear and the destructiveness of 
such gear. Furthermore, restrictions have also been known to 
be placed on the size of the units of gear to limit 
harvesting capacity. Regulations have also been devised to 
apply to the following:
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a) The length and depth of the gear;
b) Mesh sizes of conunercial fishing gear;
c) Minimum landing size of fish;
d) The banning of discards;
e) Prohibiting the carrying of nets of more than one 
mesh size per fishing voyage; and
f) The permitted species composition of landings to be 
related to the mesh size carried.
Vessel and gear restrictions are therefore methods of 
controlling and limiting the overall capacity and efficiency 
of the individual fishing unit and thus of the entire fleet.
2) INDIRECT CURTAILMENT METHODS WHICH CAN BE EMPLOYED TO 
LIMIT THE NUMBER OF FISHING VESSELS PARTICIPATING IN A 
FISHERY.
There are various methods which can be employed to limit 
the access of vessels into a fishery. The type of methods 
varies from country to country and there is no single 
universal approach. These methods of entry restrictions or 
resource rent methods have been devised in addition to the 
traditional forms of control discussed above as the former 
were deemed inadequate in controlling the amount of capacity 
or effort of fishing vessels. Their objectives are two fold
namely:
a) To limit the fishing effort and to reduce over­
capacity, and
b) To extract a resource rent as payment for harvesting 
the resource.
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These methods include, among others, the following and 
will be briefly discussed hereunder:
1. Licensing;
2. Catch quotas;
3. Taxation on vessels and equipment; and
4. Taxation on the catch.
1. LICENSING
Restrictive forms of licensing provide one of the major 
methods employed by developed fisheries in the world and this 
has become a widely adopted approach to control expansion of 
fishing effort and capacity.Licensing works by seeking 
to regulate directly who may, or may not, participate in the 
fishery. Only those who have been granted a license may 
therefore participate in the harvesting of the resource. 
Licensing as a method of granting access to a fishery may be 
even further restricted by certain terms and conditions such 
as the payment of a fee, the designation of the number and 
type of vessel and gear, and even to the establishment of a 
quota attached to the license. The question further arises as 
to what precisely has to be licensed. Is it the vessel, gear 
or the fishermen? The answer to this question depends on 
the particular custom and practices of different countries, 
but most often the license is directed at the boat or vessel. 
Whatever it is that is licensed, all licensing schemes have 
the same objective, namely to limit the fishing effort. 
License restrictions should be specific and not merely limit 
the number of vessels entering the fishery. They should place 
specific restrictions on most of the dimensions of the
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fishing effort. It is however virtually impossible to place 
restrictions on all the dimensions simultaneously as these 
are numerous and diverse (including vessel size, power, crew, 
time spend fishing, all aspects of finding of catches and 
holding gear etc.) addressing all such dimensions would be 
extremely costly and enforcement. It is therefore extremely 
difficult to regulate all the various combinations of inputs.
A FAO committee, in a 1978 review of the arrangements for 
regulating trawl fleets in the Mediterranean, already then 
reached similar conclusions when it stated that:
" Limitation of the number, tonnage and engine power of 
trawlers is not usually sufficient to -block the fishing 
effort permanently. In effect, the fishing power of a 
trawler depends, not only on the conduct and distribution 
of fishing operations, but also on a great many other 
factors (traction power, plan and rigging of the trawl, 
equipment for navigation and fish detection etc. In 
practice it seems unrealistic to attempt to establish 
clauses covering all the procedures to which one may 
resort to improve the performance of a vessels. Moreover, 
this would prevent advantage been taken of the gains in 
productivity to be expected from technological advances."
Restrictive licenses further raise problems of 
allocation. Thus to whom will a license be issued and what 
are the criteria for such allocation. Various criteria or 
methods of allocation is being used such as auctioning of the 
license or allocation to those who have traditionally fished 
in the region. Strict criteria for allocation should however 
be used as allocation could lead to problems such as 
political favoratism, unfair advantage, fraud and bribery. A 
further consideration that should be taken into account is
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the duration and transferability of the license. Most 
licenses are of medium term duration of two to five years and 
are usually non transferable.
Licences comes in a variety of forms and are difficult 
to categorize as the various systems differ in fundamental 
respects. There seems to be no clear rationale since the 
terms and conditions of licences and the way they are 
administered have not been well documented with the resultant 
complexities and problems. Some of the regulations are 
however, common to most licensing forms namely:
a) They are for a specific period and renewable;
b) Most vessels are subject to some form of replacement 
restrictions;
c) Limited entry licences are usually transferable by 
one method or another; and
d) The Minister in charge usually has discretionary 
prerogatives to grant a licence or not, suspend, 
cancel, refuse or renew it.
The following can be regarded as basic forms of licences 
under current licensing arrangements:
1) License for a specific species.
Under this form the license is linked to the species. 
Only that specific species may thus be caught during the 
duration of the licence.
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2) License for more than one species.
More than one species is coupled to the same licence and 
provides more flexibility to the licensee.
3) License for specified type of vessel and gear.
This form of licence places restrictions on the type of 
vessel and gear that may enter a fishery for various policy 
and management considerations.
4) License for certain species and quota.
In this form the licence is restrictive as to both the 
type or species of fish caught and the quantity that may be 
caught
5) Quota licence.
This form of licence assigns a specified catch to each 
licence and has certain advantages as it to a large extent 
eliminates the competitive scramble for a share of the catch 
and thus incentives to invest in excess fishing capacity.
. 6) Limited entry licences.
This method limits the number of participants in the 
fishery. The disadvantage of this form of licence is that 
although the number of persons or vessels with licences are 
fixed the authorized catch of each licence is unspecified and 
it retains the incentive to invest in excess fishing power. 
It is therefore prudent when using this system to counter 
those incentives by placing restrictions on the licence such
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as vessel replacement rules and controls on vessel 
improvements in order to prevent more investment in fishing 
power and efficiency.
2. CATCH QUOTAS
This is yet another method to restrict the total catch 
without either limiting the efficiency of the individual unit 
of fishing gear or the number of fishermen. By imposing a 
limit on the total quantity of fish that may be harvested in 
a given year through the or setting a quota, the result's 
that all fishing pertaining to a specific quota will stop 
once that quota is reached. Such a quota system is however, 
only suitable to such species or stock for which sufficient 
biological knowledge and information has been accumulated in 
order to make reasonably accurate predictions about their 
abundance sufficiently in advance of the fishing season, the 
accuracy of the predictions depend on various factors such 
as the adequate annual sampling of the population. This 
system of total catch quotas is mostly used in commercial 
fisheries. First of, a total catch quota for the year/season 
according to species, is determined by the authorities. 
Second the total catch quota -is then divided up among the 
individual licensees to catch a certain percentage of the TAC 
or more specifically to land a specified quantity in 
accordance with the license quota. This individual quota can 
be expressed as either a percentage of the TAC or in 
quantities such as tons of fish, the quota may also be 
further restricted to a specified species. Quotas may once, 
they are determined, simply be granted to fishermen upon 
certain criteria free of charge or they may be sold.
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3. TAXATION ON VESSELS OR EQUIPMENT,
This is a form of indirect restriction on the fishing 
effort and has the same effect as the other methods discussed 
above. Some economists have suggested that instead of direct 
limitations on the fishing effort, e.g.., on the vessel and 
gear through restrictive licensing, the same result could be 
achieved by taxing the inputs. (Smith 1969; Scott and 
Southey, 1970) The introduction of a high tax on the inputs 
or the catch and landings would force fishermen to operate at 
a level that is considered optimal. Fishermen would then find 
that because of the high tax imposed they are unable to 
operate at the original open access level.(Theoretically at 
least it would make no difference whether the tax is imposed 
on the catch or the vessel) The objective of the taxing 
method is to raise a tax on effort and to drive out surplus 
capacity (because it would become unprofitable for some 
fishermen to operate) until such time as the desired effort 
level can be sustained. This method however has two inherent 
weaknesses. First of all, if the tax on the vessel or inputs 
is too high it may result in the dislocation of local 
fishermen if imposed on them. There would be no improvement 
on the incomes of fishermen and may lead to a mass exodus out 
of the fisheries and these people would again have to be 
located and employed elsewhere. Due to the above, this would 
necessitate that such a tax base will have to be carefully 
planned and analyzed and would have to strike a balance 
between the principles of conservation and the social welfare 
of fishermen. Second, this method has been held to be 
"providing a ready mechanism for manipulating the 
distribution of effort among stocks and fishing grounds and 
for responding to changing circumstances through differential 
rates of tax". However, this would bring about uncertainty
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in the industry and fishermen would regard it's application 
as arbitrary and would further also resist frequent changes. 
It is also very clear that, any uniform constant levy would 
clearly be inadequate in differing and changing conditions . 
Moreover "it is difficult to visualize this flexibility in 
practice; quite apart from the administrative complexity of 
determining the appropriate rates for different locations and 
stocks (especially in mixed fisheries), the rates would have 
to be adjusted constantly to the changes in the availability 
of fish, harvesting costs and fish prices".
4. TAXATION ON THE CATCH
Imposing a tax on the catch has become quite popular 
as yet another method of limiting the fishing effort. 
Instead of putting a tax on the vessel the tax is now levied 
on the actual catch or landings. This proposal for 
rationalization of the fisheries has been proposed by many 
academics on fisheries (Anderson 1977: Bromley & Bishop 1977; 
Sinclair 1978, and others). An appropriate tax on the 
landings would reduce the financial returns of fishermen to 
such an extent that they would be forced to adopt the most 
efficient number of vessels and gear and to operate them at 
minimal cost. It has been held that "if the tax is imposed 
vigorously enough, it can effectively reduce and contain 
fishing effort by rendering it unprofitable to expand and it 
will do so without generating any of the tendencies toward 
technological distortions associated with restrictive 
licensing or on the particular factors of production. This 
method is a highly flexible mechanism as the application of 
differential rates can influence the pattern of effort and be 
manipulated among species, stocks and locations. This method
67
however also has certain disadvantages namely the following
a) It might be difficult to adapt to changing 
conditions;
b) It may lead to unequal distribution of effort;
c) Unequal distribution of benefits may also result;
d) May lead.to dislocation and affect employment; and
e) It could be administratively complex and costly to 
successfully implement.
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ENDNOTES.
CHAPTER 3.
For example the U.K and France.
Licensing is widely used in nearly all the major 
fisheries of Canada and several of those in the U.S.A 
have been subjected to restricted access during the last few years and examples are found in certain European 
countries Australia,Japan,South Africa and on an 
increasing nxamber of other countries (Me Keller). 
Licensing arrangements are also being developed by 
coastal states to regulate foreign fishing in their 
extended fisheries jurisdiction (Kaezynski 1979).
H.Pearse. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No.197.p30.para.5
CHAE»TER 4
ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS AND BILATERAL FISHING AGREEMENTS
Although fishing rights arrangements existed before the 
extended jurisdiction concept under the convention on the Law 
of The Sea, such arrangements have since mushroomed as many 
nations made full use of , their extended jurisdiction to 
acquire a variety of benefits from their living marine 
resources within their EEZ's. The access arrangements and 
terms and conditions of agreements are diversified and 
reflect the local conditions of the host countries. Despite 
these diversities in the agreements, there are many factors, 
features and characteristics in common.
A. Principles governing the granting of access to foreign 
fishing vessels.
1. The concept of surplus
The principle instrument for the granting of access to 
foreign fleets since the 1970's- was the Law Of The Sea 
Convention. Many new access arrangements have resulted in
agreements entered into as a result of the. extension of
national jurisdiction over fisheries. Under the provision of 
the Law of the Sea convention (Article 61 par. 1 of the 
convention) coastal states are required to promote the
objective of optimum utilization of the living resources of 
the EEZ. However, coastal states also have corresponding
obligations to:
69
a) determine the allowable catch of the living resources 
within the EEZ.
b) determine their own capacity to harvest the resources 
at any given time.
c) where coastal states do not have the capacity to 
harvest the total allowable catch they have to give 
other states the right of access to the surplus.
The rationale behind the concept of granting access to 
the surplus is to ensure optimum utilization of the resources 
in the interest of the international community and to avoid 
the situation where resources would be left to waste by 
incapacity to harvest them.
,It is important to note that the convention make 
specific provision to the factors to be considered in 
determining the TAG and also that negotiation remains the 
basis for the granting of access to the surplus of a coastal 
state fisheries.
2. Selection criteria for granting of access as provided in 
the convention on the Law of the Sea.
The convention provides certain specific but 
deliberately vague (to_ provide for flexibility) criteria for 
granting access to other states. Article 69 para. 1 provides 
that the coastal state shall take "all relevant factors" into 
account when granting access to other states for fishing in 
their EEZ. This vague criteria is meant to .include factors 
such as biological, economic, social and political facts. 
These factors however are not meant to be exhaustive but
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merely to provide guidelines for selection of those states to 
be granted access. The most important factors mentioned in 
the convention, namely the economy of the coastal state and 
national interest are merely guidelines of the significance 
of the resource to the coastal state.
a) Provisions of Art. 69. (The rights of land locked 
states) and Art. 70 (Rights of States with special 
geographical characteristics).
Article 69 paragraph 1 provides that coastal states 
shall allow land locked states and other disadvantaged 
countries to share on an equitable basis with nationals of 
coastal states in the exploitation of the living resources of 
neighboring EEZ's. Such arrangements are to be worked out 
through negotiations of agreements bilaterally or regionally. 
This right of land locked states and other disadvantaged 
states may be exercised only in the same sub-region or 
region.
Article 7a para. 4 provides similar provisions with 
reference to coastal states with special geographic 
characteristics. Para. 2 defines such geographic 
characteristics.
b) The requirements of developing countries in the sub 
region or region in harvesting part of the surplus.
Although very few agreements seem to specifically refer 
to this provision, its application has been considered in 
agreements between certain developing countries in the same 
region or sub region e.g., the 1976 Cuba-Mexico agreement.
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These agreements are however very few as their economic 
benefits and technology exchange value are rather limited and 
seem to be based mostly on political and ideological reasons.
c) The need to minimize economic dislocation in states 
whose nationals have habitually fished in those 
zones.
An example of the application of this principle is the 
EEC fisheries policies which provides for the fishermen of 
member states who have traditionally fished in areas under 
the national jurisdiction of another state to continue to 
fish in those areas. This is taken into consideration when 
determining quota allocations to member states. Other 
examples - fisheries agreements between USA-EEC and CANADA- 
EEC.
d) Minimizing economic dislocation of states which have 
made substantial efforts in research and stock 
identification.
Few agreements refer to this aspect since most countries 
that have made contributions to research and stock assessment 
are also those countries that have habitually fished in those 
areas. Most agreements which mention this provision 
specifically are those between developed countries.
The factors mentioned are however not exhaustive in 
determining rights of access and few agreements mention them 
specifically although they form the underlying guidelines and 
y0j-y often have political and ideological implications.
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B. Terms and conditions in granting access to foreign fleets
Article 62 para. 4 of the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea provides that foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ of a 
coastal state shall comply with conservation measures and 
with other terms and conditions established in national laws, 
rules and regulations. It further mentioned that the 
national legislation needs to be consistent with the 
provisions of the convention.
1. Requirements regarding fishing operations.
The main aim of this requirement on the scale of fishing 
operations is to direct and control the fishing capacity. 
This objective may be achieved through various methods, among 
others the following:
The number and type of vessel flying the flag of the 
contracting party authorised to fish in the coastal 
state's EEZ.
Size of the vessels.
- Type of fishing gear.
- Number of crew.
- Listing the vessels specifically by name.
- Licences only transferable under specific circumstances. 
Maximum tonnage.
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Reference to specific ownership.
Percentage of crew compliment -(nationals, etc.)
Landing of fish in local ports.
Closed areas.
Quota allocations.
Closed seasons.
Minimum fish size, etc.
These methods are merely mentioned as detailed 
description thereof is beyond the scope of this.
2. Access fees and other forms of compensation
Authorization granted to foreign fleets to fish in 
coastal states EEZ's are usually subject to the payment of 
fees. Access fees are a form of tax which are designed to:
extract resource rent from the fishery.
encourage operational efficiency in the use of the 
resource.
act as an instrument for the government to regulate, 
develop conserve and manage the fishery.
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There are essentially two ways of levying fees.
a) A lump sum payable for a fixed period of fishing, i.e. 
one year and covering the fishing activities of all the 
vessels of the flag state granted authorization to fish in 
coastal state EEZ. The exact basis for the determination of 
the lump sum payment vary from country to country. In some 
countries it may be calculated on the basis of:
- a percentage of the value of the estimated catch per 
period of time
the risk involved in developing a new fishery
- expenses incurred on placing observers on board
b) Fees may also be estimated on the basis of specific 
vessel gross registered tonnage actual catches landed, or on 
the existing fish prices.
Access fees may be demanded to be paid in cash, payable 
in kind or accept aid in the form of goods and services as 
part payment for access to its fish resources. Other forms 
of partial payment may also be included in agreements e.g.:
additional financial compensation for fishery development 
projects;
technical assistance and training in enforcement; 
granting of loans on favorable terms;
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rtraining of national seamen on board foreign vessels, or 
in national institutions of the flag state;
cooperation in scientific research;
granting of facilities of a commercial nature;
establishing of joint ventures, and
the landing of fish for local markets.
C. Types of agreements
Different governments may take different approaches in 
negotiating fishery agreements dependihg on ,their own 
particular local circumstances and conditions regarding their 
resources and their national priorities. They may differ in 
their approach to the context within which they conduct 
fishery negotiations, the form and duration of the 
commitments, the parties with whom they conclude agreements 
and the administrative mechanisms deemed desirable to 
facilitate the implementation of these agreements.
1. The structure and the duration of the agreements.
The structure and duration of fishing agreements depends 
largely on the priorities , of the contracting parties. 
Agreement can be either short, medium or long term. It is 
however obvious that the negotiating parties view the 
structure and duration of the agreements from different 
perspectives. Short term agreements may be beneficial to
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coas'tsl states in the sense that they do not have long term 
commitments on unfavorable negotiated terms, but at the same 
time provide no long term financial benefits.
On the other hand foreign flag states seek long term 
commitments to ensure continued access to the resource and 
employment of their fleets. They however may remain bound 
even when the resource scarcity in the area no longer 
warrants the expenses incurred. ' ’
Coastal states furthermore are hampered in the 
development of their harvesting capacity where national fleet 
expansion together with long term foreign fleet access 
arrangements may lead to over capacity and consequently over 
exploitation and extinction of the resource. Most coastal 
states, especially those from developing countries, also find 
themselves becoming totally dependent on foreign exchange 
earnings to the extent that future development plans for 
self reliance becomes impossible to achieve. It would seem 
that agreements are more advantageous if they vary between 
two and five years and should nevertheless be open to 
periodical review.
2. Contracting parties
Although most fishing agreements are made between 
coastal states and the flag state usually in the form of 
general cooperation agreements, . specific companies of the 
flag state may then directly negotiate with the coastal state 
through detailed subsidiary arrangements. Coastal states 
however, favor direct flag state participation as a 
contracting party in order to ensure compliance and a better
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deal. Certain circumstances may however be deemed preferable 
to avoid direct flag state participation.
A new trend has developed in recent years whereby 
coastal states in a region adopt a common fisheries policy 
with regard to negotiating fishery access agreements with 
foreign fleets. Flag -states on the other hand have also 
adopted common fisheries policies in negotiating access with 
coastal states, e.g. the EEC negotiates fishing rights on 
behalf of its member states.
3. Institutional arrangements
These are provided for in several bilateral agreements 
to facilitate the implementation of agreements in general or 
as a dispute settlement mechanism. These institutional 
bodies may be either existing or newly established bodies. 
These bodies are usually authorised in tetms of a general 
agreement or of a specific agreement and include items such 
as frequency of meetings, perhaps annually and their 
functions set out in general terms or specifically. The 
functions may include detailed measures regarding 
implementation of agreement provisions, technical 
cooperation, stock assessment and settlement of disputes, 
etc.
D. African experiences of foreign fishing arrangements: 
Mozambique and Seychelles as examples.
I will here briefly look at the gains achieved and 
problems experienced by these two South Western Indian Ocean
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coastal nations in their access arrangements with foreign 
fleets.
a) The expectations created by the extension of coastal 
state jurisdiction.
The extended jurisdiction created by the convention on 
the Law of the Sea raised expectations of better management 
and a more just distribution of living marine resources. 
Since the developing countries were the driving force behind 
the new law of the sea convention, they were expected to 
especially gain specific advantages from extended coastal 
jurisdiction. The potential for development of their 
resources was great since their was poor exploitation of 
their own resources and the demand for new fishing. grounds 
from foreign fleets were high. Since developing countries 
were not able to properly exploit and fully utilize their own 
resources due to a lack of technical and economic expertise, 
this seemed an ideal opportunity to benefit from letting 
foreign developed nations exploit the living marine resources 
in exchange for much needed financial compensation.
However, when evaluating the national fishery 
development of developing countries, it is not possible to 
ascertain definite gains for them under the new regime. Even 
selling of their resources to others as an- alternative for 
those incapable of exploiting the fish themselves has not 
proven to have been especially beneficial. The main effect 
of EEZ's for developing countries so far has been the 
conclusion of access agreements with foreign nations allowing 
them access to exploit the fish resources in exchange for 
payment.
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b) The strategies employed by these two countries:
Both countries are heavily dependent on their fisheries 
and have opted for a political strategy to revive their 
ailing fisheries sector and economies by emphasizing foreign 
participation and subsequent dependence thereon. This 
dependence led to them entering into various fisheries 
agreements with foreign countries and subsequently their 
traditional coastal fisheries show signs of decay.
Mozambique's strategies were based on objectives other 
than mere foreign exchange earnings. Their intent was also to 
increase local consumption and improve the living conditions 
of fishermen. Both national and foreign fisheries were meant 
to contribute towards the achievement of all the national 
goals. With time a complete division developed between its 
two fishery sectors. The artisanal sector is taken care of by 
its nationals - with the help of foreign aid, while its 
industrial sector is completely dominated by foreign 
participation. Both of these countries have thus come to 
realize that the national artisinal fishery sector does not 
sufficiently contribute towards the attainment of national 
goals and thus the increasingly crucial role played by 
foreign interest in their commercial fishery.
c) The gains of foreign participation
Foreign participation in these two countries has become 
institutionalized through licence agreements and joint 
ventures. The Seychelles has licensing agreements with South
80
Korea, Japan, Panama and Mauritius and bilateral agreements 
with the EC and Soviet Union. Mozambique has licence 
agreements with South Africa, former Soviet Union, the EC and 
former and joint ventures with companies in Japan,
Soviet Union and Spain.
The financial gains in foreign earners for these two 
countries in their agreements with the EC are rather low as 
neither of these fee payments exceed 2.5% of the value of 
the resource for these two countries. The main currency 
earnings's for these two country in fact comes from a 
compensation paid to them by the EC. This significantly 
raises the sum received to between 5 and 10 percent of the 
value of the resource. Both countries also include 
provisions in their agreements for "non financial" gains such 
as by-catch delivery for local marketing and employment of 
nationals.
Although these provisions are rather vague and watered 
down by phrases such as "if possible". These provisions in 
the agreements especially with the EC are on the whole 
modest, lacking in concrete commitment and not easily 
enforceable.
d) The reasons for the low gains
. The most important reasons for the low returns for their 
resource can be attributed to two main factors, namely:
1) lack of negotiating power,
2) poor compliance.
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These two factors have been concluded as the two main 
reasons for the failure of foreign fishing agreements in real 
terms for Mozambique and Seychelles. May - Kristin Ensrund, 
in a research report from the Fridtjof Nausen Institute in 
her paper explained these reasons as follows.
1) Lack of negotiating power
An agreement, she says is the outcome of negotiation and 
can be analyzed in terms of bargaining power. Bargaining 
powers depend on the one hand on each party' s general power 
resources (control over something that the other party wants) 
and on the other hand the intensity of one party's interest 
in something the other party controls. It is assumed that 
the one that is less willing to risk a non agreement has less 
power.
Developing countries possibly risk a "neo colonialist" 
exploitation, since they are generally the weaker part. 
Dependence, competition for the transnational firms capital 
and technology and the lack of alternatives are realistic 
considerations.
She continues by saying that the lack of qualified 
personnel and the reluctance on the part of Mozambique to 
accept foreign assistance during negotiations might possibly 
have resulted in an inferior position for Mozambique in the 
negotiations.
At one stage the negotiations had to be postponed due 
to a lack of negotiators on the part of the Mozambicans and 
that the skill of one or two persons in the fisheries
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administration were crucial to what was actually achieved. 
Furthermore the differences in organizational capacity of the 
flagstate EC and the coastal states are a major setback for 
the latter.
Increased EC activity in the region for tuna resources 
has led to increased rivalry and competition between the 
various countries of the West Indian Ocean. The lack of 
cooperation on issues such as information gathering, standard 
formulation and common surveillance activities is the major 
contributor to weaken the negotiating position of developing 
coastal states in negotiating agreements with developed 
countries. The dependence of developing countries for foreign 
assistance will therefore continue until such countries are 
in the position to exploit their own resources.
2) Poor Compliance
Two essential observations are evident from the two 
actual agreements, namely that coastal states do not just 
want a purely commercial relationship with the foreign 
fishing nations, and second, that some of the requirements 
are formulated in such a non commercial way that enforcement 
is difficult or impossible.
Poor compliance can also be attributed to the fact that, 
in the case of Mozambique, a lack of infrastructure has .led 
to poor compliance with its agreement provision for by-catch 
delivery for internal consumption. This failure has been 
attributed not so much on the low price and lack of interest 
of fishermen but also the malfunctioning of the collection 
system.
83
wAs far as the employment provision for nationals are 
concerned there is a general reluctance on the part of 
foreign fleets to employ nationals from the coastal states. 
This is however not surprising since, the EC subsidizes its 
distant water fleets mainly for the employment of European 
fishermen.
Both countries, due to poor enforcement and control 
capabilities, are incapable of accurately determining what is 
taken from or within their zones. > The major benefits for 
these fisheries, especially for the Seychelles has come from 
the indirect gains involved. These include the spin-off 
effects like service, repairs and supplies which accounts for 
more than three times the licence fees. The lack of 
employment on foreign vessels has been compensated for by the 
rise in employment in fishery related business.
Lastly, control over the fishery is lacking mainly due 
to inadequate qualifications of personnel and weak 
organizations with few resources. Both countries face 
serious management problems in that they conduct very little 
intensive fishing themselves and that they are not able to 
make a direct catch control.
E. Lessons for Namibia.
.From the above cited examples the reasons for the low 
gains to these two countries can be seen to be the fact that 
they acted from a position of weakness and negotiated with 
more informed, skilled and organized opponents. Mozambique 
and the Seychelles are however mere examples in point and not 
the only countries in the African region to receive such low
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rgains from foreign participation in the exploitation of their 
ocean fish resources. In view of the original intentions of 
more equitable distribution and fairness, as intended by the 
architects of the Law of the Sea convention. Namibia must 
make a point of doing better.
The aim of extended coastal jurisdiction in terms of the 
convention was to grant to developing countries an added 
advantage in contributing to the development and welfare of 
their people. However, most developing countries, even those 
with rich fish resources, have obtained very little real 
benefit by allowing foreign countries to exploit their 
resources and consequently very few definite gains in 
relation to the exploited resource under the new fisheries 
regime. Developed countries have, due to a number of various 
factors, among others the poor surveillance and monitoring 
capability on the part of developing countries, overexploited 
the resources and not contributed to the development of the 
fishery and people. Rather they have used these provisions 
intentionally to derive quick and easy profits.
It is for these reasons that Namibia should avoid 
similar mistakes in allowing foreign access to it's resources 
by ensuring that they have at their disposal well informed, 
skilled and experienced negotiators, negotiating power, and 
clear and unambiguous terms and conditions of access (In this 
regard see further Chapter 6).
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ENDNOTES.
CHAPTER 4.
^ ’ GDR - German Democratic Republic former East Germany. 
These agreements now form part of the Agreements of a 
United Germany in as far as they still exist.
See aticle by May-Kristin Ensrund. p.57-60
Ibid. "Around 300 Seychellois now work at onshore 
instalations on land because the Seychelles have become 
the chief transhipment harbour in the region" p. 60, 
para. 3.
CHAI»TER 5
ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Regulating a fishery is one of the management methods of 
conservation and forms part of the coastal state jurisdiction 
over the resource. However it becomes meaningless to have 
regulations if management is not capable of enforcing such 
regulations. Enforcement therefore becomes an integral part 
of the management functions and the different aspects of 
enforcement shall be discussed here.
A. THE NEED FOR CONTROL AND THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ENFORCEMENT
There is a need for some form of control over the 
fishing activities within the country's EEZ. If there is a 
need for regulations in achieving management objectives then 
there exists a corresponding need for control over the 
fishing effort and subsequently a need for enforcement and 
compliance with fisheries rules and regulations. Because of 
the regulatory regime for fishing the need for enforcement 
competence and compliance measures arises. Coastal states 
must therefore, due to their jurisdiction under the Law of 
the Sea Convention, also have the competence to enforce any 
regulations within it's area of jurisdiction subject to the 
provisions of the convention. There however, exists a need to 
devise methods to. minimize physical enforcement actions. The 
question of the cost of enforcement arises and the economic 
principle of marginal cost equaling marginal revenue should 
also be applied in the enforcement context.
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The legal aspects of enforcement under contemporary 
international law provides that Coastal states have complete 
enforcement authority within it's EEZ. Such authority and 
Coastal state competence is however restricted by Article 73 
of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea by prohibiting 
sentences for fishing violations that include imprisonment or 
any other form of corporal punishment. However national 
legislation of many coastal states provide for such 
penalties. Another aspect which is common for violations of 
Coastal states laws is the forfeiture pf fishing vessels and 
gear. This penalty exists despite the fact that Article 73 of 
the Convention provides that vessels and gear must be 
released from custody upon the posting of a reasonable bond 
or other form of security. Many loopholes are apparent in 
this provision. How is the amount of the bond determined? Is 
it related to the value of the vessel and gear or to the 
value of the catch? Furthermore the posting of a bond of 
security is an indirect form of forfeiture and the inference 
can be drawn that although forfeiture as a direct security 
measure is prohibited it may still be used as a final 
penalty.
A further issue that arises is whether fisheries law, 
like other regulatory regimes, should be subject to criminal 
or commercial law. According to certain writers and opinions 
expressed at the Law of the Sea Convention in Jamaica it 
should lie within commercial law as it rests on commercial 
interest and calls for regulatory instruments suitable for 
commercial activity. The basis for this assumption is that 
criminal law demands standards of proof that are onerous and 
provides for penalties which are not sufficiently
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Idiscriminatory. Criminal law it is contended remains 
appropriate for such crimes as poaching and theft for which 
severe penalties including jail are suitable. But, offences 
against identifiable commercial interest are better 
controlled under commercial law with more appropriate 
financial deterrent and punishment that fits the crime. It 
should however be borne in mind that mere financial penalties 
are sometimes not sufficient deterrent to big financial 
interest who are prepared to risk being caught fishing 
illegally in developing countries with low penalties and 
especially in those instances where those countries have vast 
ocean areas to cover and few control or enforcement 
capabilities. Big financial interest then work on the 
assumption that their chances of being caught are minimal. 
This viewpoint is however not a-feasible proposal in certain 
legal systems and need careful consideration.
B. INSPECTIONS
Inspections form part of the enforcement function of 
seeking compliance with fishing rules and regulations, and 
further more with the apprehension and bringing charges 
against offenders. This task of inspectors are more easily 
facilitated as regards national fleet landing their catches 
at local ports. However, the task is much more complicated as 
regards distant water fleets who land their catches at 
foreign ports. In the case of foreign vessels with access to 
a coastal states EEZ it is difficult to monitor and control 
catches and furthermore to seek compliance with issued 
quotas. Various countries'has sought to overcome this 
problem by placing inspectors on board foreign vessels as
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robservers. However, this has not proved altogether 
satisfactorily as the use of observers has certain 
disadvantages such as the large number of personnel required 
with the subsequent additional cost of wages and training 
involved. Furthermore observers on board foreign vessels need 
to be dedicated and committed nationals who can withstand the 
temptations of bribery.
In order to determine the effectiveness of management a 
system of evaluation of the inspection service has to be done 
in terms of cost, benefits and efficiency.
I. Effort
The effort by an inspection service as regards its size 
and framework are mostly dependent upon the characteristics 
of the country in terms of geography, area of EEZ, 
organization structure, the size and type of the fishing 
industry and the importance of the fishing sector in the 
national economy. It is difficult to determine exactly the 
needs, level and dispatching of control services in any given 
country and countries developed yearly from their own 
experiences, different systems with varying degrees of 
success and efficiency.
At present the most reliable method of evaluation seems 
to a comparison of the cost of the system with the turnover 
of the fishing industry.
i ,e.
UK. 1981
£22 million - cost of system 
£229 million - turnover
i
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Reason- The UK has a comparatively small national fleet with 
big fish stocks which are exploited mostly by other EEC 
countries and therefore the high cost of surveillance and 
monitoring.
France. 1981 ff 650 mi 11ion-turnover Cost estimated at less 
than 2%
Reason -low cost is that about 60% of French catches are made 
abroad and subsequently they do - not contribute to the 
surveillance and monitoring cost which is paid by the country 
in whose waters they are fishing,
2. Efficiency.
Managers of the fishing industry wishes to know the 
level of success of their services, enforcing fishing rules 
and regulations. There are however, no hard and fast rules 
for evaluating the efficiency of their enforcement services. 
There is thus no one good method but only an accumulation of 
signs such as the following:
- Scientific surveys
overfishing may lead to decreasing stocks and thus a lack 
of control. This is however, no clear indication but a 
relation may exist and is therefore assumed.
- The number of inspections at sea.
- The ratio
the number of registered fishing vessels/number of 
inspections.
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The number of detected fishing vessels/number of 
inspections.
The number of fishing patrol vessels (or planes) engine 
hours/number of inspections.
Number of sentences/number of breaches, etc.
Evaluation of these factors.
These factors although not conclusive may be indicative 
of the efficiency of the inspection service and the 
theoretical basis for improvement.
3. Proof
One of the main task of inspectors for the laying of 
charges for fishing rules and regulations is the gathering of 
sufficient evidence to bring charges which may lead to a 
conviction in court for violations.
Inspectors should furthermore be properly trained for 
their task as it is becoming more and more difficult to prove 
charges in court. Fishermen have learned through experience 
to contest the facts presented in court as regards the 
position of the ships, the area, the procedures, etc.
Another factor for consideration is the question as to 
what is admissible evidence as some countries do not accept 
photographic proof of air surveillance as evidence of 
violation. In most criminal legal systems the burden of proof 
rest on the prosecution and this may prove difficult to 
discharge. A way out of this dilemma would seem to be to 
shift the burden of proof on the accused. This could be
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achieved by introducing a separate set of evidentiary rules 
specifically applicable to fishing violation.
4. Penalties
Penalties are determined by the courts and may vary 
between the minimum and maximum prescribed penalties provided 
in the law. However, the penalties laid down in the laws of 
different countries are not sufficiently high to act as a 
meaningful deterrent in violation of fishing rules and 
regulations.
In the UK the . low penalties laid down by the law have 
proved to be a frustrating issue for fisheries enforcement 
officers. Too often fishermen will risk fishing illegally or 
violating fishing rules and regulations as they are prepared 
to pay the low fines imposed by the courts as compared to the 
possible financial gains of a good valuable catch.
Another point worth mentioning is the fact that in most 
countries judges and magistrate are not sufficiently trained 
and interested in fisheries J.aw. Court cases for fisheries 
violation are dealt with in the course of a day's proceedings 
in criminal courts by judges and magistrates more versed and 
interested in other criminal issues such as theft, robbery 
and murder.
The result hereof is that fishery cases are often dealt 
with on as a routine business by judges and magistrates and 
not sufficient priority given thereto in criminal courts. It 
is submitted that fisheries cases be separated from ordinary 
criminal cases and tried by separate tribunals well vested
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and experienced in fisheries laws. However it is recognized 
that is may be impractical in most countries and not cost 
effective due to the small amount of violation of sufficient 
severity to justify criminal proceedings, and the ratio of 
fishery cases compared to other criminal cases imbalanced.
Further it is important to note that in cases where 
penalties are too high inspectors may be reluctant to 
prosecute due to the problems that such high penalties 
create. The rigidness of penalties should be avoided by 
granting penal discretion to judges and magistrates. High 
penalties may lead to an exit out of the fishing business as 
fisherman in most instances are unable to pay. Flexibility in 
the license system could also be used as a means of 
punishment for fishery offences. For example a violation on a 
hake quota may lead to the withdrawal of that quota while 
maintaining the quota on another species. In this regard a 
point accumulation system leading to total forfeiture is 
recommended.
C. REQUIREMENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT
1. Enforcement Tasks
Management objectives, policies, rules, and regulations 
become operationalized through enforcement. Physical
enforcement of fishing rules and regulation may be regarded 
as part of the executive functions of management. In most 
countries of traditional and overexploited fisheries, 
enforcement is generally directed at protecting, controlling 
and conserving the resource and also in resolving conflicts
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between various interests groups of fishermen (in a directed 
fisheries).
In the case of non-traditional and under-exploited 
fisheries enforcement is applied to prevent and address 
illegal fishing activity. At all stages of fisheries 
development, an additional management aspect of enforcement 
is the collection of information and the storage of data in a 
timely, accurate and orderly manner as it is this data which 
forms the basis of future management decisions - enforcement 
includes the following tasks:
a) Preventing unlicensed vessels from fishing in a country 
area of jurisdiction and ensuring that licensed vessels 
comply with the provisions and conditions of the licence;
b) Ensuring that fishing areas or zones established for 
specific sizes of vessels or gear are protected from 
other fishermen, i.e. certain specified inshore or 
nearshore areas;
c) Eliminating or minimizing the use of prohibited gear and 
destructive or harmful fishing practices; and
d) Protecting spawning, breeding feeding areas, endangered 
species, and other areas closed for harvesting.
2. Specialized equipment for enforcement.
Equipment needed for enforcement in vast areas are 
highly specialized and capital intensive. Not only is the 
capital cost high but also maintenance costs. The type of
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equipment required may vary from country to country and 
depends on the particular needs of that country as well as 
the geographical area involved. The equipment must be 
selected with care and should . be suited to the particular 
conditions prevailing in each country. However, heavy 
capital expenditure is necessary for meticulous and 
sophisticated enforcement. Also in this instance the economic 
principle of marginal cost equaling marginal revenues are 
also applicable in the determination of the equipment needs. 
Equipment needs for enforcement may include among others the 
following:
a) Patrol' vessels - larger, long range, more enduring ones 
with more powerful equipment for offshore and smaller, 
lighter ones for inshore work.
b) Aircraft - with low-flying capabilities for accurate 
detection and large area coverage.
c) Radio communication - to allow continuing coordination 
among enforcement officers. An encrypting system is 
essential.
d) A coordination centre - for coordination between patrol 
vessels, aircraft and enforcement officers and office 
space for personnel data input and collection
- for decision making such as arrest and prosecutions
- for instruction and planning for day to day work as 
well as for long term.
- as a reference centre
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e) Vehicles - for land mobility and storage areas for
vessels and gear seized in the conduct of enforcement.
3. Specialized skills required for enforcement
Enforcement personnel should be well trained in order 
for them to efficiently and effectively execute their various 
tasks and duties. They should therefore acquire or develop 
the following skills.
a) Surveillance - The gathering of intelligence over fishing 
activities and landing of catches.
b) Arrest and seizure - including training in obtaining and 
preserving evidence for later court action.
c) Prosecution of offences - assist State Prosecutors in the 
presentation of the case and act as expert witnesses.
d) Familiarity and training in fisheries and maritime law 
and regulations.
e) Adeptness in the operation and handling of ehforcement 
equipment.
f) Data collection and monitoring pertaining to vessels, 
their gear catch, and activities as well as to states 
with vessels in the area.
g) Extension and information dissemination to facilitate 
understanding by fishermen of fishery laws and regulat­
ions.
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h) Public relations orientation to facilitate good rapport 
and cooperation with fishermen.
D. PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT, IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION OF 
MANAGEMENT.
The most singular problem of enforcement implementation 
is the high cost of equipment, maintenance and skilled 
manpower. However, high cost is a necessary expenditure for 
a meticulous and sophisticated enforcement system, especially 
for those states where the fishing industry plays a crucial 
role in the overall national economies.
Cost must be weighed against the benefits gained from 
enforcing the particular regulation and country's enforcement 
needs. Licensing of fishing vessels, and the declaration of 
open and closed fishing seasons are two of the main methods 
of monitoring the level of fishing efforts. Port authorities 
may also assist in the monitoring of catches landed in local 
ports to determine whether catches exceed the quota for a 
particular species caught. Air surveillance and radio 
communication may also assist in ensuring that vessels are 
fishing within allocated zones.
A further aspect is that there is no sense in 
introducing fisheries rules and regulations if they are not 
capable of being effectively implemented in order to achieve 
management objectives. There is also no guarantee that rules 
and regulations once -adopted will necessarily be carried out 
correctly. Furthermore, some rules and regulations are
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extremely difficult to enforce and require the necessary 
backup systems for effective enforcement.
Coastal states have originally tried to control foreign 
fishing efforts but have come to realize that not only 
foreign fleets but also their own fishermen are equally 
capable of damaging the fishery resources if uncontrolled. It 
is recognized that full control is not possible but that 
acceptable levels of infringement must often be made as a 
compromise. This may however have an influence on the quota 
levels and therefore a percentage of the quota should be 
retained to allow for illegal catches. Last, but not least, 
penalties for violations must be weighed or balanced against 
the aim of regulations, which is to deter. However, although 
heavy penalties may act as a deterrent they may be of little 
value if the system for detection and apprehension is not in 
place.
E. REGIONAL COOPERATION; THE REASONS FOR IT'S FAILURE
Regional cooperation has already been thoroughly 
discussed in various papers and articles by numerous writers 
but has for most regions remained an unattainable goal. Many 
regional programs in a variety of areas have already been 
started but very few have actually come to fruition. 
Generally only some meaningless conferences and meetings of 
stated objectives occur without any truly positive actions.
The concept of regional cooperation has become an 
accepted strategy for economic and social development 
especially in developing countries so why have so few come to
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actual fruition? I will briefly look at what I believe to be 
the main reasons for the failure of regional cooperation 
schemes, especially in Africa.
Most regional cooperation schemes in Africa failed due 
to the following:
1. Lack of true commitment
2. Lack of organizational structures and political 
infighting
3. Lack of continuity and dependence on sponsorships
4. National self-interest and short term objectives
1. Lack of true commitment
True commitment at the higher levels of government is 
one of the most important reasons for the failure of regional 
cooperation agreements specially in Africa. Many wonderful 
plans and objectives has been formulated by a number of 
regional or sub-regional groupings yet very few of those 
objectives are ever achieved or led to any positive action. 
Too often, low level government officials with no real 
authority and sometimes very little experience in the 
particular arena are sent to attend such meetings many of 
whom do just that they merely attend but do not even actively 
participate.
This attitude of African governments seem to be evident 
even at international forum such as IMO, etc. but they rarely 
contribute or even actively participate in the actual 
proceedings leading up to the final decisions. Many of these
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delegates are not even well versed and informed about the 
subject matter under discussion. Yet they attend year after 
year sometimes at a great expense merely to accept plans and 
decisions already made without an inkling of whether their 
own interests has been protected.
Regional programs can only succeed if there is true 
commitment at the highest governmental level to put into 
action their stated objectives. True commitment includes not 
only political commitment but also financial commitment to 
ensure positive action. Objectives will remain merely 
objectives if the necessary machinery for implementation is 
not provided. Sometimes new structures are created where 
existing ones can fulfill the same functions leading to 
unnecessary duplicity. Careful planning at ministerial level 
should include as part of the ministries budget a portion for 
the attainment of regional cooperation objectives. The 
commitment to provide the necessary financial and material 
resources for implementation of regional programs should go 
side by side with the political commitment. Long term 
planning and coordination of efforts at the top level of 
government can make the concept of regional cooperation an 
attainable objective. Too often regional cooperation 
programs are used as a means of political expediency and 
doomed to failure.
2. Lack of organization and political infighting
Most developing countries lack the ability to organize 
themselves into well planned meaningful organizational 
structures and effective power brakes. A regional approach 
to cooperation in these areas such as fishing can indeed be a
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powerful negotiating tool especially for those countries in 
close proximity to each other and who share similar fish 
resources. Poor organization and the lack of a common 
approach will continue to be detrimental to countries who 
negotiate access agreements with well organized foreign 
fishing interest.
The lack of a common fishing access approach by 
developing African countries, and their lack of organization 
has led to overexploitation of their fisheries resources and 
low returns. Well organized foreign interests are therefore 
seen to easily manage to play one government against another 
and thereby obtain most favorable terms of access with no 
real or very low returns for the exploitation of their 
fisheries resources. An effective coifimon regional approach 
can go a long way in eradicating this sad state of affairs.
Poor organization and political infighting has led to 
the demise of some wonderful cooperation schemes. Some 
countries simply lack the ability to organize themselves 
effectively due to various factors such as lack of skilled 
managerial and organizational personnel in positions of 
authority due to political appointments in government 
positions. Political appointments in high offices of 
government with little skill and experience leads to a 
situation where actions are based on political short-term 
expediency. Political infighting, self gain, and self 
interest for advancement of individual stature and position 
within regional structures too often leads to the formation 
of organizations where little is achieved and no decisive 
positive actions are accomplished.
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This furthermore lead to a situation that there are too 
many regional organizations with overlapping functions and 
objectives. To date it is still uncertain as to what, other 
than many far fetched schemes and a lot of lip service, are 
really achieved by organizations such as Preferential Trading 
Area and Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
The functions and objectives of these two regional 
cooperation associations for Southern Africa overlap. Even 
though this has been recognized for many years, very little 
effort has been made to rationalize their respective purposes 
if any. The combined cost of keeping such organizations in 
existence with very little positive action is a waste of time 
and money that could surely be put to better use.
3. Lack of continuity and dependence on sponsorships
Many development programs sponsored by U.N. 
organizations and other non-governmental institutions have 
come to a collapse in developing countries as soon as the 
period of sponsorship comes to an end. As soon as the 
foreign donors withdraws their financial and technical 
assistance from a project, then the project itself comes to 
an end in complete collapse. The main reason for this lack of 
continuity is due to the lack of planning by the governments 
to provide for the necessary resources to continue such 
projects. Any program, no matter how successful will 
collapse as soon as the resource base for operations are 
withdrawn.
The same applies to regional cooperation in fisheries. 
Initially, governments could use some sponsorships or donors 
both financially and technically. But, they must plan
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beforehand for the continuation of such a program once the 
initial donors withdraw. The necessary financial support 
structure must be maintained in order to implement and 
maintain such regional cooperation programs. The main aim of 
a regional or sub-regional fisheries cooperation program 
should thus be towards eventual self-reliance in order for 
such a program to be positive and effective.
4. National self interest and short tera objectives
Regional cooperation programs should be based on common 
interest and objectives. By the pooling of resources in 
matters such as fisheries management, surveillance and 
monitoring, duplication can be avoided, cost reduced and 
effective enforcement achieved. (See.chapter 6 B)
Short term national self interest has led to the demise 
of potentially meaningful and worthwhile regional cooperation 
programs. Instead of exploiting those things which they have 
in common, countries within the same region too often adopt 
short term policies whereby their resources become 
overexploited, at times, very guickly and to the extent that 
they may never recover. By competing with each other instead 
of cooperating and adopting a common approach, many countries 
soon find themselves in the situation where their commercial 
fishing sectors are dominated by foreigners and they become 
totally dependent on them for their foreign currency 
earnings. Even such short term financial benefits will 
disappear once the resources are depleted and the foreign 
fishing interest moves on to more productive fishing grounds.
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F. EXPERIENCES ELSEWHERE AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS AS AN 
EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL REGIONAL COOPERATION.
Most fishing nations of the world find it extremely 
difficult to have an effective enforcement service due to the 
large costs involved. The methods employed and equipment 
used vary from country to country according to local 
circumstances and peculiar difficulties. It is even more 
difficult to decide on a single method and which equipment is 
suitable in a particular country.
The United Kingdom
In the U.K. the enforcement of fisheries law and 
regulations reside with the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Fisheries or MAFF. Enforcement in the UK is both a military 
and civilian operation. Sea patrols are carried out by the 
navy due to historical reasons and more specifically as part 
of that countries overall security objectives. Air 
surveillance on the other hand is carried out by an 
independent company on a contract basis with the MAFF. Both 
components however, act under the authority control and 
direction of the MAFF. The MAFF headquarters in London act 
as a coordination centre from which all operations are 
planned and directed, MAFF furthermore has regional 
inspectorates for inspections of landing at local ports.
The U.S.A.
In the USA the enforcement role of fisheries law, rules 
and regulations is a purely military operation by the U.S. 
Coast Guard. Both sea patrols and air surveillance are thus
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done by the coastguard. The US coastguard has amongst 
others, the function of fisheries law enforcement. The 
reason for the use of a military operation is because the 
coastguard has amongst its other functions the function of 
guarding the US coastline for reasons of security, smuggling, 
illegal immigration-etc.
The South Pacific Islands
The South Pacific Islands of Papua, New Guinea, .Kiribati| 
Solomon Islands, etc., carry out a common fisheries 
enforcement program under the umbrella of the South Pacific 
Fisheries Forum, through technical assistance from the U.N.'s 
FAO organisation. The success of the South Pacific Islands 
in successfully implementing a regional enforcement program 
and common fisheries policy, can be attributed to various 
factors.
First of all the South Pacific Islands has been 
especially favored by the extended EEZ jurisdiction under the 
law of the sea Convention. More than anything else its 
unique geographical location and extended jurisdiction 
favored these island states as it's limited land territory 
now extends seawards. Secondly these island states are 
largely dependent on their fisheries resources as a source of 
food, a major earner of foreign capital, or as more concisely 
stated by Peter Vargese:
".... effective maritime surveillance is as much a 
question of economic security as it is of law
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enforcement. Maritime surveillance capability is so 
important to the island states because marine resources 
are so crucial to their economies^^
In an article, Don Aldous, from the department of 
Fisheries and Oceans, Halifax, Nova Scotia the Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FFA) for the South Pacific Islands came 
into existence and operates as follows:
"A convention was ‘ drawn up and was acceded to by the 
twelve Foriim members of the time in October 1979. The 
convention established the agency to promote regional 
cooperation in various' aspects of fisheries with the 
benefits from the living marine resources of the region 
for their peoples and for the region as a whole and in 
particular the developing countries."
More specifically; "The Work program of the FFA covers 
the harmonization agreements; fisheries surveillance and 
enforcement; current information services; tuna... fishing 
development; economic analysis; fishing patterns; fisheries 
and administrative training; regional fisheries register; the 
delineation of fisheries and related zones."
The operations of the FFA are still largely sponsored by 
donor organizations.
Don Aldous continues further to argue that the 
surveillance needs of the island states are unique as to 
their geography, "as much of the region remains uncharted in 
modern times". This presents problems of navigation in the 
area. Surveillance of the EEZ's of these island states
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therefore raises unique problems. The population and 
industrial base of the region cannot support the large 
expenditure and supporting infrastructure necessary to 
maintain an extensive surveillance program. The island 
states therefore decided to set for themselves realistic 
goals for surveillance of their EEZ's, "recognizing the 
vastness of the zones and the availability of funds, manpower 
and equipment the island states cannot afford to mount 
extensive, sophisticated programs. They will however, need 
some capacity to enforce their rightful jurisdiction over 
fishing nations. This starts at the negotiating table. The 
terms of an access agreement must reflect the coastal states 
ability to enforce the agreement. For example, if it is not 
possible by any means to verify the quantity of fish caught 
then it would make little sense to limit the catch of foreign 
fishing vessels to a quota.
Hardware or equipment is therefore a necessary expense 
in order to provide some measure of enforcement capacity 
appropriate to the conditions, needs and capabilities of the 
island states. Furthermore training programmes should be 
geared to providing knowledgeable and capable administrators 
in the future.
Regional cooperation has been achieved among the South 
Pacific Islands by adopting the following.
1. A regional register of fishing vessels.
2. Common criteria for access to EEZ's.^,
3. An FFA surveillance program
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- The Pacific Patrol boat project.
- Regional Air Surveillance.
4. Regional Observer Program.
5. Surveillance Officials Meetings.
6. National Program Development.
7. Regional Telecommunications project.
8. Regional Information Systems.
9. Training Programs.
10. Regional Surveillance Center.
Through a system of regional cooperation the Pacific 
Island States under the FFA created a powerful administrative 
tool in controlling the fishing activities of foreign fishing 
vessels in their waters.
By adopting a common approach and banding together they 
have had more success in their power of negotiating with 
foreign fishing nations. By banding together they have 
eliminated the risk involved of entering into separate 
negotiations by each member government. Foreign fishing 
interests are merely interested in negotiating the cheapest 
most beneficial deal and control negotiation by playing off 
one island nation against the other.
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CHAI»TER G
A. CONCLUSIONS
The effective and successful implementation of a policy 
for EEZ management should include a full range of the 
following ingredients.
(1) The delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf vis-a- 
vis opposite and adjacent states. This would require a 
sound knowledge of the resource, both living and non 
living as well as their relative value since such 
knowledge would have a significant influence on the 
negotiating power of the parties involved.
(2) The development of a fisheries management system. Such a 
management system ' should include both internal and 
external factors such as;
- control over foreign and domestic fishermen,
- negotiation of joint ventures for production, 
processing and marketing,
- setting of biological and socio-economic objectives,
- protection of the interest of local fishermen.
(3) This policy for EEZ management further requires knowledge 
of the following;
- trends in the distribution and abundance of the 
fish resources,
- responses to fishing pressure,
- location of spawning and times,
- distribution of catches and fishing effort by area,
- surveillance and enforcement capability.
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- comprehensive national fisheries legislation,
- - trained human resources, .
The Namibian Government should furthermore develop an 
integrated ocean management plan whereby all the various 
actors and sectors in ocean use are identified and their 
input into the plan accommodated. This is very important 
since Namibia's marine policy cannot develop in terms of 
fisheries alone. By developing an integrated marine and ocean 
policy and plan potential multiple sea use conflicts and 
complimentaries can be identified and existing and potential 
sea use problems avoided. Such a plan must look at potential 
conflicts between the various actors such as fisheries, the 
marine environment, coastal zone management, shipping and 
navigation, possible energy development, pollution etc.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Regional cooperation as a strategy for economic 
development
The South Pacific islands under the umbrella of the 
Forum is perhaps the only example of regions of developing 
countries where regional cooperation in fisheries management 
can be said to have worked. Due to the commitment on the 
part of the member countries, a truly common workable 
approach has been adopted, not only for„fisheries management, 
but also with regard to access.
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It is hereby submitted that a regional cooperation 
within a Southern African Cooperation should be based on some 
of the principles of the South Pacific model. Regional 
surveillance and control of fishing activity can be more 
effectively implemented between countries immediately 
surrounding Namibia specifically a democratic South Africa 
and a peaceful Angola.
The South Pacific, in conjunction with FAO and other 
sponsorships, put into place the Foreign Fisheries Agency 
which has created a successful regional program of fisheries 
management by adopting common policies, and by harmonizing 
the following terms and conditions of access:
(a) Subscription to the Regional Register of Foreign Vessels
(b) Licensing procedures and the functions of authorized 
personnel (observers)
(c) Catch reporting and maintenance of log books
(d) Timely reporting of catch
(e) Entry to and exit from EEZ's and the identification of 
licensed vessels, etc.
It is thus suggested that Namibia, South Africa and 
Angola should explore and implement such a program of 
harmonization as a licensing policy objective for the region. 
True commitment on the part of these countries through 
initial high level authorized meetings should seek tp 
implement a regional fishery program. The above mentioned
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terms and conditions of access could be negotiated and 
implemented as initial steps for regional cooperation. Other 
aspects of fisheries access such as methods used for 
determining fees, can be harmonized through time.
A workable agreement can certainly be negotiated by 
using donor organizations such as the FAO and their 
experience as a point of departure. It is further submitted 
that the data collected and stored by the former 
International Commission for South East Atlantic at FAO 
headquarters should be used and activated as a basis for 
starting such a regional program.
Regional cooperation could eventually be implemented in 
other related areas such as enforcement, pollution and 
general security.
2. Resource Management and Regulations
As was seen in Chapters 2 and 3, fisheries resource 
management objectives are to exploit the living resources of 
the oceans in a sustainable way through the implementation of 
various measures and regulations. The various measures that 
could be adopted have already been discussed in detail. 
However, it is important to stress certain issues that need 
consideration. The objective of management is further taken 
to be the optimum utilization of the resource which contain 
two basic elements, namely
(a) extracting the maximum net benefit from the resource, and
(b) the distribution of cost and benefits in such a manner as 
to be acceptable to all participants.
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When referring to maximum net benefits from the resource 
it is necessary to deal with it in terms of both the total 
benefits that can be produced as well as the total cost 
involved in their production. Benefits therefore refer to 
all values to society that can be produced from the resource. 
When one considers the production aspects of the resource 
the conservation measures are deemed to imply ensuring 
desirable levels of supply from the resource and this can 
only be achieved by taking into account the cost and benefits 
associated with achieving it. It is furthermore important to 
consider not only immediately obtainable benefits but also 
future benefits.
The cost which should be considered here is management 
cost external to the operations and includes such cost as 
information necessary for management, and of ensured 
compliance with management measures and regulations
(monitoring, control, surveillance and the judicial
processes). Also to be considered is transaction cost (the 
cost of negotiating agreements, formulating, implementing 
management measures). Thus there should be an equilibrium 
between the benefits from the resource and the cost. 
Formulation of management measures serves no purpose if they 
are not capable of being effectively implemented and 
enforced.
Furthermore, the satisfactory fulfillment of management 
cannot be achieved without the three basic functions of 
management namely:
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1. Information acquisition
2. Control over production and the inputs of capital and 
labour (regulation), and
3. Enforcement.
Consideration should also be given to the allocation 
aspects of management. The objective of allocation should be 
to arrive at an acceptable pattern of distribution. The 
acceptability of the distribution arrangement is an important 
factor for stability within the system as it would ensure 
that those who are affected by the arrangement shall feel 
that they are better off by complying with it than breaking 
the arrangement.
In this regard it is submitted that a platform should be 
created in Namibia to cater for continuous dialogue between 
administration, industry and fishermen. It is thus proposed 
that a Fisheries Consultative Council be created to 
facilitate such dialogue. Various problems in the fisheries 
sector such as management objectives, measures, regulations 
and problems could be discussed and continuously 
evaluated. Such a representative council will ensure better 
understanding of management measures and compliance with 
regulations. Fishermen are more likely to comply with 
measures which they regard as acceptable and fair than with 
those that are merely forced on them.
Finally a method is suggested whereby a gradual 
Namibianization of the national fleet can be achieved while 
at the same time controlling the fishing effort. In Chapter 2 
(1.2) on the regulation for controlling the fishing effort 
has been briefly touched upon. This has however been merely
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a brief description of what it entails. The need for 
controlling the fishing effort is necessary for reasons of 
conservation and sustainable resource development on the one 
hand, and to prevent overexpansion of the fleet and 
overinvestment on the other. In my opinion there are two 
further reasons, namely the Namibian interest and that of 
the Namibian population. It is submitted that Namibia,has the 
unique possibility to adapt the fishing effort to the 
resources. In order to achieve this, fishing agreements with 
foreign fleets to exploit the fish resources should be 
regarded as an interim measure and should be planned and 
directed as such. These fishing agreements wfth foreign 
interests should thus be for short tender with reservations 
for renewal and must then be followed by a timescale for 
Namibianization of the fleet in order to attain the al^ility 
to exploit the resources ourselves and at the same time to 
promote and extend the local processing industry. The French 
governments shrimp fishery policies, introduced in 1982 in 
French Guyana, determined to pass the shrimp fleet under the 
French flag and can serve as an example in point for the 
gradual Namibianisation of the fleet. The French adopted a 
policy whereby one foreign shrimper must leave the. French 
Guyana waters when one French shrimper is entering within the 
French Guyana fleet. The effect of such a policy is to 
gradually reduce the foreign participation while increasing 
local entrants by not renewing one licence, of a foreign 
vessel for every new vessel entering the national fleet. Thus 
on a one to one basis the foreign participation is reduced 
and local participation increased while at the same time the 
fishing effort is maintained at acceptable parameters. This 
policy also caters for those instances where such foreign 
vessels comes under the Namibian flag and will thus be
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regarded as part of the Namibian fleet. Namibianisation of 
the fleet could be achieved by using a similar method.
3. Access Arrangements.
As we have seen (Chapter 4) the principles governing 
access arrangements are derived principally from the concept 
of managing a surplus of stocks whereby and the extraction of 
a resource rent for the utilization of the resource can be 
effected. Access is therefore a method for sharing a 
resource and the benefits to be allocated to participating 
states is essentially a matter of negotiation.
Most fisheries access arrangements to foreign fleets 
originate either as bilateral, multilateral or joint venture 
arrangements. The governments of the states involved are 
usually the initiators of such arrangements. Such agreements 
are then implemented through foreign fishing operators or 
through other forms of licensing systems.
It is therefore evident that careful but decisive 
negotiations are the cornerstone to success. If one 
considers the Mozambique/Seychelles experience (See Chapter 
4) the reasons for their failure are obvious due to the 
factors mentioned. The failure of the access arrangements of 
these two countries in their agreements with foreign states 
were mainly due to poor negotiations on their part and non 
committal provisions in the negotiated text, the latter 
creating loopholes for non or poor compliance.
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It is therefore imperative that such negotiations be 
conducted by knowledgeable, well informed and skillful 
negotiators. The text of agreements should be worded in such 
a manner as to be certain of its interpretation and to exact 
true commitment on the part of the parties thereto.
Further, careful consideration should be given to 
agreements in the form of joint ventures. Joint ventures 
have become a popular means of developing a particular sector 
of the economy where the state lacks the necessary capital, 
skills or manpower to develop a resource worth exploiting. 
In fisheries, such joint ventures are usually undertaken 
where the coastal state has a valuable resource in its EEZ 
but lacks the technical expertise or capital to fully exploit 
this resource. Joint venture agreements can therefore be 
utilized as a means of obtaining foreign capital, or 
management, or technical skills, or the necessary equipment. 
Such an arrangement can further include provisions for local 
control over activities of the venture, transfer of 
technology, and training of local personnel.
The concept of joint ventures can provide an alternative 
idea or solution for instance countries which have fisheries 
resources and wish them to be ultimately exploited by their 
own nationals but in the interim are unable to do so. 
However, seemingly These apparent attractive advantages of 
joint ventures in fisheries are often based on 
misunderstanding, false expectations and lack of true 
commitment and compliance. Various reasons for the failure 
of such joint ventures have been cited elsewhere and are 
quoted here.
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W.R. Edeson in his article "Agreements for Exploitation of 
EEZ Fisheries" explains some of these misconceptions and 
false expectations created by joint ventures when he says:
"Despite its apparent advantages, the joint venture system, 
in fisheries such as in other sectors, has had a chequered 
career. In part this is due to false expectations by one or 
both parties. The State with the exploitable resource for 
example might expect to gain control over the activities of 
the venture because it (or its nationals) has a majority 
holding in the capital share of the venture. Often, however, 
this control has proved illusory because the overseas partner 
has important de facto controls through its greater 
management expertise. Sometimes this agreement itself may 
disguise the real level of foreign control. Where for 
example decision making may be vested in foreign managers, 
under a management agreement, or in an executive committee 
which is in effect a veto on the more important decisions. 
Another difficulty has been differing perceptions about the 
same agreement - the coastal State partner often seeing it as 
an agreement about transfer of technology, training manpower, 
etc., while the foreign partner might see it only as a devise 
for gaining access to a particular fishery, while looking on 
the conditions imposed as irritants perhaps to be given token 
observance only.
A complicating factor can occur when the government of 
the host country may have certain objectives when it permits 
joint ventures to be set-up, but these objectives are not 
necessarily shared to the same degree by a local private 
enterprise partner. The government, in allowing such a 
venture might, for example, intend that a transfer of
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technology should occur, or that local persons should be 
trained in relevant fisheries skills, while the motive of the 
local private partner might be simply to make a quick profit.
Not least among the problems that may be encountered is 
the possibility that very complex business relations can be 
set up to manipulate profits in such a way that the coastal 
State partner obtains practically nothing, while the foreign 
partner, through such techniques as affiliated company 
transactions and transfer pricing, or through the 
manipulation of company capital and related loan agreements, 
maximizes its profits. Woven through these factors, are 
inevitable risks of misunderstandings based on differing 
cultural assumptions between the parties. Clearly, 
therefore, if joint ventures are to have any real chance of 
success, they will need to be planned and negotiated with 
considerable care.
In addition, it is vital that the government should have 
a clear idea just what it wants to achieve by a system of 
joint ventures in fisheries, and that its views are 
communicated to and clearly understood by all parties. 
Publication by a government of the guidelines or objectives 
or minimum requirements can be very useful in ensuring that 
several of the pitfalls mentioned above are avoided.
Finally, it is unlikely that a joint venture will be of 
much benefit to a country unless there exists in the private 
or public sector an entity which is able to take an active 
part in the venture and which can both benefit from and 
absorb the benefits of participation.
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At the risk of over generalizing, it does seem that 
experience over the last ten years in the area of exploiting 
EEZ fisheries by the use of joint venture mechanisms is doing 
much to reduce the misunderstandings between the coastal 
state and the foreign entity, with the result that they are 
more likely to be negotiated and assembled in a more 
realistic environment than has always been the case 
hitherto. There are however many advantages in the forming of 
joint ventures and the above quotation is merely used to 
illustrate that despite their apparent attractiveness joint 
ventures have many pitfalls."^^^
Finally, it is important to note that Namibia would be 
well advised not to repeat the same mistakes as those made by 
Mozambique and the Seychelles(See Chapter 4). As Namibia 
enters fishing venture negotiations with foreign countries 
Namibia should ensure that:
1) Their negotiators are well informed persons about all 
aspects of the fisheries trade in issues such as market 
prices, state of the stocks, and the existence and 
comparative knowledge of similar types of agreements 
elsewhere. Being well informed can be a powerful tool in 
negotiations and enhances ones negotiating power;
2) That the skilled, knowledgeable and experienced persons on 
their fisheries negotiating teams includes persons 
educated in a variety of disciplines such as the law, the 
economy, finance, and fishery research;
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3) The terms and conditions of the agreements are well worded 
and clear as to interpretation without ambiguity. This is 
essential to ensure compliance; and
4) Their negotiating team is well prepared and backup by a 
well defined plan that includes a harmonized system of 
access arrangements; this can provide tremendous advantage 
to their negotiating power.
4. Enforcement
I will here briefly touch on two important aspects 
namely that of inspection and surveillance. As Namibia is a 
young nation it would be virtually impossible for her to 
undertake an extensive surveillance and enforcement program 
on its own. The reason for this is simply because cost of 
surveillance and monitoring equipment is costly, properly 
trained personnel are few and the sea with its 200 mile EEZ 
is vast, covering approximately 1800 to 1900 km.
Due to the above reasons a regional approach for law 
enforcement of its EEZ and controlling and managing its 
fishery resources would seem a logical solution. Namibia, 
South Africa and Angola share common boundaries and resources 
and a regional surveillance, monitoring and patrol system 
would be an effective tool and method for control over 
foreign fishing operations, apprehension of illegal fishing 
in the region and the sharing of cost of equipment and 
personnel.
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Regional cooperation can actually be started with the 
exchange of information on shared stocks and coordination of 
access conditions within the region. Regional enforcement 
can be implemented through exchange of information regarding 
the vessel movement and may later lead to shared surveillance 
facilities and to regional sanctions.
The following plan of action is hereby proposed for the 
implementation of a i^egional surveillance, monitoring and 
control program.
4.1. Planning a Surveillance and Control System
When planning an enforcement system of surveillance and 
monitoring, the following issues should be carefully 
considered.
4.1.1 That the primary aim of a control and surveillance 
program should be the establishment of a data base for 
fisheries intelligence. In order to design and plan a 
system all available .sources of information on the 
fisheries should be used, exchanged, pooled and 
constantly updated by all participants in the regional 
program.
4.1.2 All regulations should be practically enforceable. 
The effectiveness of any control system will be in 
direct relationship with the caliber and training of 
the personnel involved. They should have a close 
knowledge of the fishery both in' order to plan 
operations and to spot possible offenses. Inspection
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Ienforcement personnel should have a high degree of 
skill and seamanship and avoid any undue use of force 
in order to maintain credibility.
4.1.3 Great care should be taken in the choice of sanctions 
applied for the various offenses in fisheries 
legislation. Legislators have to be careful in 
imposing sanctions out of proportion with the offense. 
The degree of seriousness of the offense should be 
well defined and appropriate sanctions imposed. 
Careful study of the implications of the seizure of 
vessels' catch and gear should be made. In cases of 
seizure, it is often preferable to allow the owner to 
purchase back the vessel at reasonable cost in 
relation to the value of the vessel, catch and the 
gear since the cost of maintenance and storage could 
be high.
4.2. Initiating a Regional Program
Regional cooperation in surveillance, monitoring and 
control could be initiated by Namibia, South Africa and 
Angola by setting up a regional surveillance and enforcement 
meeting enjoining the full support and commitment of their 
member governments. The purpose of such a meeting would be 
to promote regionalism in fisheries surveillance and 
monitoring in the south east Atlantic. Initial discussion 
should be initiated by high ranking officials with authority 
preferably over ministerial level in order to obtain true 
commitment. Topics for initial discussion should include:
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1. Patterns of foreign fishing in the region
2. A regional air/sea surveillance plan
3. Legal implications, i.e., evidence
4. Regional communication gathering
5. Training of personnel
6. A framework for future discussion and cooperation
7. Setting of a permanent time table for continuous 
discussion between regional surveillance officials.
4.3. Implementing a Regional Surveillance, Control 
Monitoring Program
4.3.1 A regional observer program
A regional training and education program should be 
implemented to facilitate uniformity in the application of 
rules and regulations and to specify the functions of 
observers and inspectors within the region. Observers can be 
placed on board foreign vessels for purposes of monitoring 
catch and for the collection of biological data. The design 
of the program can be implemented through discussions between 
government and industry officials. The program can be 
implemented through training courses, manuals, etc.
4.3.2 A regional surveillance and monitoring centre
To operate as a coordination centre through a regional 
telecommunication network and information systems. Secure 
and a reliable communication are needed on national and 
regional level and to undertake efficient and timely 
surveillance program and develop a regional data bank to
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benefit the members. A telecommunication system is required 
using the latest technology which is reliable, easy to 
install and operate and cost effective. The development of 
such a regional database should preferably be separate from 
existing public standard telephone links which is usually 
slow, costly and inefficient and prone to interruptions and 
interference which hampers good communication. The regional 
database will furthermore enable member governments to update 
and access information from national centres. The 
possibilities of new technology such as remote sensing and 
Inmarsat should also be considered.
An information system on the other hand is needed to 
back up fisheries laws and agreements. Monitoring programs 
where foreign vessels submit zone entry, zone exit and weekly 
catch reports and even daily position reports from each 
vessel fishing in the zone. Data analysis by administration 
further needs the assistance of computers for summary 
reports and analysis of data concerning the fishing effort 
and catch. Computer units should be in place and the 
development of the necessary software can be achieved for EEZ 
management through assistance from donor countries.
4.3.3 A regional register of fishing vessels
For all foreign vessels applying for licenses, regional 
observers, a catch and effort form, reduced reporting and 
common vessel identification requirements. A regional 
blacklist of offending vessels can be complied and 
continuously updated with some sort of information system for 
regarding le, changes in vessel names, owners, etc.
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4.3.4 A regional surveillance program
Furthermore, through the pooling of resources of 
equipment and personnel regional air and sea patrol program 
can become affordable, (see section on surveillance 
equipment) From the list of equipment needed for an 
efficient system is evident from said list and as mentioned 
a capital intensive project and therefore great care should 
be exercised in the selection of equipment for such a 
regional surveillance and monitoring system. The monitoring 
control and surveillance requirements and operational needs 
for such a system should be carefully evaluated under 
operational conditions before the commitment of capital 
resources. Equipment in the region should also be compatible 
to avoid operational problems. Proper pre-planning and 
evaluation can help to avoid inappropriate or even 
unnecessary expenditure e.g., air craft range found to be 
inadequate, speed of air craft too high to permit observers 
to work or the system is found to be too expensive in 
relation to returns from licenses, etc.
The surveillance project should further be design with 
the following main objectives:
1. Provision of technical advise to member governments
2. Promoting and coordinating fisheries surveillance 
programs
3. Collation of reports on Vessel activities.
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(C) THE WALVIS BAY ENCLAVE AND SURROUNDING ISLANDS - AN
IMPORTANT FACTOR.
Walvis Bay on the west coast of Namibia is the only 
deep-water harbour in the territory. A second harbour exists 
further south at Luderitz but does not have the same water 
depth and does not have the same facilities as Walvis Bay and 
is less frequently used. Walvis Bay on the other hand is the 
most important port and serves as both a commercial and 
fishing harbour. It has a well developed infrastructure with 
good road and rail links to the Namibian hinterland. The 
enclave furthermore facilitates most of the countries fishing 
activities as well as other marine related supporting 
industries. The problem is that the enclave and surrounding 
islands are claimed by South Africa as their territory in 
terms of an agreement with Britain after the second world war 
even though the enclave and islands are situated within 
Namibian geographical boundaries.(SEE MAP 2)
Namibian independence in March 1990 was part of an 
agreement between South Africa the U.N and five western 
powers. At the time it was decided (as a compromise to not 
further delay the independence process)that the Walvis Bay 
issue would be dealt with between a post independence 
Namibian government and South Africa. To date the issue still 
remains a matter of dispute although negotiations between the 
two parties have commenced and a joint administrative 
authority is to be implemented in the near future. As this 
was to be merely an interim measure a final solution to the 
dispute becomes a matter of urgency as the enclave and the 
islands remain of vital economic and strategic importance to 
Namibia. Furthermore continued uncertainty, is not conducive
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to continued good relations between the two countries whose 
economies and history are intricately linked.
The importance of discussing this issue is the fact that 
the continued claim to the enclave and the islands by South 
Africa makes a mockery and a farce of the extended EEZ 
jurisdiction granted to coastal states in terms of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The result of this claim 
over the area has the effect in contemporary international 
law of cutting directly into the Namibian EEZ resulting in 
patches of the EEZ belonging to South Africa and patches to 
Namibia.(See Annex 2) This distortion of the EEZ consequently 
leads to numerous problems in the exercise of Namibia's 
rightful jurisdiction over the whole extent of the proclaimed 
EEZ. It furthermore leads to complex problems in law, 
administration and enforcement. The fisheries administration 
in Namibia is faced with the problem that it has to direct 
it's operations and administrative functions from the inland 
capital Windhoek and the less suitably situated port of 
Luderitz. Fishing activity in the port of Walvis Bay remains 
under the South African administration even though Namibian 
registered fishing vessels operate from Walvis Bay.(It is 
interesting to note that the Namibian ship registry is 
situated at Luderitz.) Effective control over it's fishing 
fleet by the Namibian fishing authorities is therefore 
compromised and consequently leads to higher administrative 
cost because "of the distances involved. Furthermore 
enforcement, monitoring and surveillance of -fishing activity 
in the EEZ is hereby complicated and illegal fishing activity 
made easier. If one considers the amount of recently reported 
illegal fishing activity, predominantly by the Spanish. A 
further complicating factor is the vastness of the sea area
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to be covered by sea patrols and air surveillance. Fishermen 
fishing illegally in the territory can easily escape into 
those areas of the EEZ under South African jurisdiction and 
thus avoid capture when detected and pursued in the Namibian 
EEZ. The effectiveness and efficiency of monitoring, 
surveillance and inspection services is thus undermined.
The Namibian government has, since independence, started 
negotiations with South Africa for the return of Walvis Bay 
and the surrounding islands to Namibia. However the 
negotiations have been too slow and to date very little 
progress, if any at all, has been made. The main reason for 
the slow progress can be said to be the following:
1) The reluctance on the part of South Africa to release the 
territory for strategic military reasons. South Africa 
continues to maintain a high military presence in the 
Walvis Bay area and thus in Namibia with whose present 
government it has fought a long protracted war prior to 
independence.
2) Through its continued presence in the area, it exerts 
effective control over the countries economy by 
administering the only deep water commercial port and 
biggest fishing harbour in the territory.
From the aforementioned it is thus clear that there is 
great reluctance on the part of South Africa to relinquish 
the territory. South Africa therefore entered negotiations 
merely as a sign of good faith to appease the international 
community to lift sanctions but without any real commitment 
on its part and continues to use evasive tactics to sidetrack
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the negotiations. It is difficult to understand South 
Africa's reluctance to return the islands surrounding Walvis 
Bay other than for their strategic value. The control 
which they exert from this position plays havoc with 
Namibia's management of its EEZ. The islands are totally 
uninhabited and have no real economic significance.
South Africa it is thus clear, cannot be trusted. It has 
developed through years of experience in defiance to world 
opinion, craftily refined delaying tactics and negotiating 
skills. It is thus ho wonder Namibia at last realized its 
only option available was to take the issue to the 
international community. Namibian independence was only 
achieved through continuous international economic and 
political pressure, the high cost of the protracted war to 
South Africa and the changing internal political situation 
within South Africa. South Africa's white dominance is 
supported by military domination and dependence tactics . As 
long as the white minority government remain in power in 
Pretoria and the internal political situation remains 
unchanged and unstable, the Walvis Bay territorial issue will 
continue to be delayed by South Africa thereby retarding the 
economic development in Namibia.
The South Africa track record is clear. Its present 
regime will never willingly relinquish control over the 
Walvis Bay area. Negotiating with a former colonial 
counterpart is not likely to bring about a change of heart in 
the South Africa white colonial mentality. .It will therefore 
continue to stall real progress in negotiations by creating 
all sorts of linkages especially of an economic nature given
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the Namibian dependence on imports of agricultural and 
manufactured goods from South Africa.
Taking the Walvis Bay area issue to the international 
community seems to be both politically wise and economically 
prudent. As isolation tactics and internal economic pressure 
is largely responsible for the independence of Namibia and 
the recent changes in South Africa. By challenging South 
Africa, bona fide negotiations of the issues within an 
international forxam may lend greater credibility to the 
Namibian claim to the territory. Such a change in strategy 
may accelerate the chance of real progress in negotiations 
and force South Africa to commit themselves to resolving the 
issue.
Furthermore, South Africa's efforts to become more 
amenable to world opinion and their resolve to rejoin 
international organizations such as the U.N. can be used 
effectively to challenge its bona fides by exposing its 
noncommittal attitude on to these important negotiations 
within the international political arena. South Africa 
should be pressurized to accept a settlement of the dispute 
through impartial arbitration, mediation or conciliation. If 
however, if South Africa cannot be persuaded to agree to such 
international dispute settlement methods then Namibia should 
officially charge South Africa with illegal occupation of 
part of its territory at the International Court of Justice. 
It should thus challenge the South African claim of 
jurisdiction. Although the issue was already decided by the 
World Court of Justice in 1971, it related to the illegal 
occupation of the territory as a whole and not the Walvis Bay 
area specifically. Re-opening the issue by formally re-
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charging South Africa at the World Court of Justice, will 
give international prominence and exposure to the issue and 
hopefully commit South Africa to stop its hide and seek 
tactics and make its position clear. Past experience has 
however shown that South Africa unfairly manipulates all its 
Southern African neighbors by exerting economic pressures 
upon those dependent upon the South Africa economy. South 
Africa punishes political dissension by economic means. This 
should be constantly borne in mind when dealing with that 
country and Namibia should be well advised to be cautious and 
constantly alert to South Africa's tactics. Zimbabwe is a 
good example of a country where South Africa uses economic 
sanctions to extract political conformity.
Lastly, Namibia should in its own self interest continue 
to support a negotiated political settlement in South Africa 
as the cost of protracted violence and civil strife will be 
disastrous not only to that country as such but to the whole 
Southern African region as a whole. I am of the opinion that 
a political settlement in South Africa and a changed regime 
in Pretoria will be most advantageous to a successful resolve 
of the Walvis Bay issue. Continues political and financial 
support for the major political factors in South Africa 
politics can be most beneficial to Namibia as the African 
National Congress has already officially vowed that Walvis 
Bay will be returned to Namibia should it come to power in 
South Africa. Walvis Bay's return to Namibia therefore 
remains a high priority in order for Namibia to achieve its 
long terra fisheries development objectives.
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ENDNOTES.
CHAPTER 6.
W.R Edeson. p. 22-23 para. 3.
Map 1. The Namibian Fishery: Resources and Capacity
Key
Depth contours 
International boundaries 
Benguela Current seaward edge 
Continental shelf
CATCHING RESOURCE
METHOD SYMBOL SPECIES
Purse P Pilchard
•seine A Anchovy
Sa Sardinella
M Chub and horse
mackerel
Midwater M Chub and horse
trawl mackerel
Bottom H Hake.kingkiip
trawl S Sole
Line Sn Snoek
Trap and L Rock lobster
ring-net C Crab
Cull Se Seal
Harvest G Bird guano
Operational factories (1982)
© Pelagic fish processing (tinned, meal.oil,salted) 
© White fish freezing and processing 
© Rock lobster and crab processing 
® Boat building and repairing
SOURCE : MOORSOM. 1984.
ANNEX I I
Fig 3. The Collapse of the Pilchard
Key
Total biomass'
Juvenile biomass; O and 1 year olds
Key
------------------ Total fleet hold capacity; 000 tonnes
------------------CPUE; tonnes landed/100 tonnes fleet hold capacity.
weighted to allow for technical improvements
.....................  CPUE: kg landed/100 litres of fuel issued
Notes: 1. Pre-1967 estimates vary; the values given here approximate the trend of 
several sources. Earlier assessments put the peak 1967 biomass at nearer 4m tonnes. 
Natural fishing mortality is taken throughout as M = 0.5.
Main sources: Thomas 1982, table 9; Troadec et al 1980 p.266f, table 7 & fig 1; 
Newman 1977, tables 18-19; Le Clus & Thomas 1980, table 8; Schiilein et al 1978; 
Fishing Industry Handbooks; SFRI Annual Reports.
SOURCE : MOORSOM. 1984.
Shore landings 
Total landings 
Factory ships
ANNEXin
Fig 4. The Offshore Fish Stocks
(a) Population, catches & quotas
Cape hakes
Million
Cape horse mackerel
Million
tonnes
Key
OTMBM Adult biomass'' -------*------Quota
------------- — Nominal catch * Uncaught quota
..................  Approximate data
iSOURCE : MOORSOM. 1984.
(b) Rshing effort & catch rate 
Cape hakes
Key
Catch per unit of fishing effort (CPUEP 
Fishing effort
Notes
1. Adult biomass defined as hake aged 3 to 7 years in ICSEAF divisions 1.3 and 1.4, and 
3 to 9 years in division 1.5, plus horse mackerel aged 2 and over.
2. For hake, the unweighted mean of the separate ratios for divisions 1.3-4 and 1.5, and 
therefore approximate.
Sources: ICSEAF Proc. & Rep. and STOCK 1982; Table A4.
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ANNEX IV
Fig 5. Impact of Fishing on Namibia's Major Fish Stocks 1965-83
Adult
biomass’
Pilchard 
Anchovy 
Cape horse mackerel 
^ Cape hakes 
Projected data
Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Notes:
1. Hake aged 3 years and over, horse mackerel and pilchard 2 years and over, anchovy one year and over. Horse mackerel excludes the 
Cunene sub-species which is significant in the far north but for which there are no data. Values for 1982-3 are projections based on age 
structure.
annex V
Map 2. Control of Namibia's Offshore Fishing Zone
Key
10°E
20°
25°
30°
10°E
1-4
CAPE CROSS ICSEAF Division 
Seal i. Claimed by SA
WALVIS
BAY Towns
ORANGE RIVER Rivers
Boundaries of ICSEAF Divisions
V »= Namibian 370km fishing zone
Territory& fishing zone claimed by SA
Seaward limit of main fishing grounds 
(depth=1000m)
International boundary
SOURCE : MOORSOM. 1984.
ANNEX VI
FUTURE POTENTIAL OF NAMIBIA'S FISH RESOURCES.
This represents a forecast of probable yields of 
Namibian fish resources in the short, medium and long term 
and only represent indicators of probable levels as 
variability is a well known feature of marine fish stocks. 
Therefore the figures of annual potentials presented below 
should be considered as guidelines only and future TAC’s 
should be regarded as guidelines for future exploitation 
only. Future actual TAC's should however be based and decided 
on stock assessments and scientific research data relating to 
the species under question and economic factors in the 
respective industry.
SHORT TERM. ( 1-5 years )
Efficient restrictive measures of fishery regulations to 
improve conditions of depleted stocks are to be applied. 
Indicators of annualTAC's and probable landings for the by- 
catch species may be( 1000 t ):
1
HAKE
HORSE MACKEREL 
CHUB MACKEREL 
PILCHARD 
ANCHOVY 
SNOEK
KINGKLIP AND MONKFISH 
SQUIDS
DEEP WATER CRABS 
ROCK LOBSTERS
60-150
450
20
0 or 40-50 for canning 
0 increasing to 100 
10
5 
3
6
0.5
MEDIUM - TERM (5-10 years)
During five years of restrictions, the hake stocks will 
be recovering and the TAC’s can be increased gradually. The 
pilchard stock may be sufficiently recovered to allow a small 
fishery for canning. Horse mackerel may decrease as other 
stocks increase. Indicators of probable medium-term yields 
may be ( 1000 tons ):
HAKE 200 - 300
HORSE MACKEREL 400 - 300
CHUB MACKEREL 30
PILCHARD 50 - 100
ANCHOVY 100
SNOEK 20
KINGKLIP AND MONKFISH 10
SQUIDS 5 - 10
DEEP WATER CRABS 6
ROCK LOBSTER 1 - 2
2
LONG - TERM
Depleted and overfished stocks have recovered.
Considerable fluctuations in stock conditions will occur.
especially for anchovy and pilchard. and TAC' s must be
adjusted accordingly. The approximate long term yields are
likely to be ( 1000 tons ):
HAKE 300 - 350
HORSE MACKEREL 300
CHUB MACKEREL 40
PILCHARD 300 - 500
ANCHOVY 100 - 200
SNOEK 20
KINGKLIP AND MONKFISH 10 - 15
SQUIDS 10
DEEP SEA CRABS 6
ROCK LOBSTER 2 - 3
SOURCE: GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER ON NATIONAL FISHERIES POLICY
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA. WINDHOEK AUGUST 1991.
3
BIBLIOGRAPHY
GENERAL
1. Besseling, J, "A Review of the South West African Fish 
Resources" Comments submitted in Socio-Economic 
Conference, 1982 (SWA) Namibia, Windhoek, 1983.
2. Cram, D.L. and Visse, G.A. "SWA Pilchads Stocks Show 
First Sign of Recovery" SASNFIR, 28 (3), 1973.
3. Cram, D.L. "SWA Pilchad Stocks Continue to Recover" 
SASNFIR, 29 (2), 1974.
4. Cram, D.L. "Poor Prospects for Pilchads" SASNFIR,
32 (4), 1977.
5. Cram, D.L. "Hidden Elements in the Development and 
Implementation of Marine Resource Conservation Policy: 
The Case of the SWA/Namibian Fisheries" Giants and 
Thompson, 1981.
6. Moorsom, R.J.B. "Labour Consciousness and the 1971-1972 
Workers strike in Namibia" Development and Change, 10 
(2), 1979.
7. Moorsom, R.J.B. "Exploring the Sea" CIIR Series, Vol.
No. 5, A future for Namibia, 1984.
1
SCIENTIFIC
8. Butterworth, D.S. "The Value of Catch - Staistics - 
Based Management Technologies for Heavily Fished, 
Pelagic Stocks With Special Reference to the Recent 
Decline of the SWA Pilchad Stock" VCSEAF C.S.P., 7 (2), 
1980.
9. Cram, D.L. "Comprehensive Research into SWA Fisheries" 
SASNFIR, 33 (2), 1978.
10. Rothschild, B.J. "The Fish Resources of Namibia:
Present Status and Options for Future Policies" Food and 
Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1982.
11. Thomas, R.M., Hewitson, J.D., Bohme, H. "Suggested 
Explanations for a Shift in Catch Position of Juvenile 
Anchovy of SWA in 1978" SFRUI, Fishing Bulletin, 16, 
1982.
12. Thomas, R.M. "Catch Age Growth and Stock Assessmentof 
SWA Pilchads (Sardinops Oceata) in Division 1.3, and 1.5 
for 1982, ICSEAF SAC, SP 34,1982.
PERIODICALS
13. FAO, The EEZ Programme, FAO Fact Sheet, Rome, 1980.
2
14. FAO, Background Paper on Agricuture, Fisheries and Food 
Securing in Namibia, Paper submitted to the Planning 
Workshop on the Nationhood Program of Namibia, Maputo, 
1980.
15. FAO EEZ; Comprehensive Program of Assistance in the 
Development and Management of Fisheries in Economic 
Zones, information folder, Rome, 1980.
16. FAO Fisheries Report No. 293 , Experts Consultation on 
the Conditions of Access to the Fish Resources of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, Rome, 11-15 April 1982.
17. FAO Fisheries Circular No. 842, Compendium of Basic Text 
Concerning International Management and Devlopment of 
Their Fisheries, Rome, 1992.
18. Pearse, P.H., Regulation of Fishing Effort, FAO 
Fisheries Technical Papers No. 197, Rome, 1980.
19. Savini, M.J. "Information on the Role of International 
Fishery Bodies With Regard to the Conservation and 
Management of The Living Resources of the High Seas" FAO 
Fisheries Circular No. 838, Sepetember 1991.
20. Report on Proceedings of the FAO/SouthWest Indian Ocean 
Committee/Workshop on Licensing and Control of Foreign 
Fishing, FAO, Rome, 1984.
21. Strategy for Fisheries Management and Development, FAO, 
Rome, 1986.
3
22. Corroz, J.E. and Savini, M.J. Bilateral Fishery 
Agreements FAO Circular No. 709, Rome, April 1978.
23. Burke, W.T. and Clinsky, F.T. Options for the 
Management of Tuna Fisheries in the Indian Ocean, FAO 
Fisheries Technical Paper No. 315, Rome, 1990.
24. Collected Scientific Papers, ICSEAF, Annual Report 
1973, Madrid, 1974.
25. Scientific Papers, ICSEAF Scientific Advisory Council, 
1973.
26. SWA Handbook, SWA Agency Co.
SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
27. SWA Administration, White Paper on Activities of the 
Different Branches, Annual, Namibian Fisheries Were 
Tansferred to South Africa in 1969.
28. Commission of Inquiry into South West Africa Affairs, 
South africa, R.P. 12, 1964. Commonly knovm as Odendaal 
Report.
29. Commission of Inquiry into the Fishing Industry...SA 
and SWA, Interim Report,South Africa,
On the efficiency of research on the potential yield of 
the fish resources of South Africa and SWA, unpublished, 
1970.
4
30. Interim Report and recommendations with regard to 
certain aspects of the exploitation of the pelagic fish 
resources utilized by fish meal and canning industry of 
SA and SWA, Final Report Submitted, Cape Town, 3 Dcember 
1971, Pretoria, R.P. 47 - 1972.
31. Official Statements and Submissions to Plenary Sessions 
of ICSEAF, notably 1975, July 1981, December 1981.
32. Commission of Inquiry into the Fishing Industry, SWA, 
submitted 30 November 1966, Windhoek, 1967.
ARTICLES
33. Sandoval, K. ’’Foreign Fishing in the South West Indian 
Ocean: Case Studies of Mozambique and the Seychelles" 
International Challenges, Vol. 10, No. 4, May 1990.
34- Eikland, P.O. "Norwegian Fisheries Management After the 
Introduction of the EEZ's - 'The Tragedy of the Commons: 
To Be Played on Another Stage?'" International 
Challenges, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1991. 35. Pease, H.
"Turning the Tide: A New Policy for Canada's Pacific
Fisheries" The Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy, 
Vancouver, B.C., 1982.
36. Bowman, D. "Licensing Distant Water Tuna Fleets in
Papua New Guinea" Guinea: Butterworths and Co., 1987.
5
37. Everlast, H. and Youngs, W.D. "Regulations and Their 
Effects" Published in the Second Edition of Principles 
of Fishery Science.
38. Andersen, s. and Wettestad, T. "International Resource 
Management: Political Conflict and Scientific 
Uncertainty" International Challenges, Vol. 11, No. 2, 
1971.
39. Lucas, K.C. "Fisheries Management" Unpublished paper at 
WMU Marine Affairs I Seminar, 1991.
40. Floistad, B. "Communication Between Science and Decision 
Makers: The Advisory Function of the International 
Council for Exploration of the Sea" International 
Challenges, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1990.
41. Nikitina E.N. "Environmental View of Extended
•Jurisdiction and Conservation of Living Marine 
Resources: Soviet Perspective" Paper delivered at the 
Law of the Sea Conference, Malmo, Sweden, August 1991.
42. Anderson, L.G. "Is the LOS Convention Addressing Today's 
Changing Marine Scientific, Technological, Economic, 
Legal and Political Issues?: A Fisheries Perspective" 
Unknown publication.
43. Laevastu, T. and Favorite, F. "Fisheries and Stock 
Fluctuations" Unknown Publication.
6
44. Carioz, J. arid Savui, M. "The Practice of Coastal States 
Regarding Foreign Access to Fishery Resources" FAO 
Fisheries Circular Nn. 709.
45. Moore, G. "Regional Co-operation in Controls Over 
Foreign Fisheries Operations" FFA Second Regional 
Fisheries Legal Consulations, Rome, 1986.
46. Edeson, W.R. "Types of Agreements for Exploitation of 
EEZ Fisheries" Paper presented at the 19th Law of the 
Sea Institute Annual Conference, Cardiff, Wales, 1985.
7
